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1.1 THEME AND BACKGROUND 
   The theme for this master‟s thesis is the problem concerning “double Sami votes”. What 
does this term, double vote really mean? In fact each individual member of the Sami 
community (or more precisely of the Sami census) votes in the same way as any other 
Norwegian. The exception to the rule is in regard to elections to the Sami parliament. In this 
matter only those registered in the Sami census can vote (more on this matter later). In other 
words, the Sami people (depending on definitions) have an extra democratic channel from 
which non-Sami peoples are excluded;  in addition to the other democratic electoral channels 
to which all citizens of Norway have access (municipalities, counties and the national 
legislature). 
    This thesis seeks to analyze this with a democratic theoretical approach. Many questions 
could be addressed; however, it is important to look at whether the minority status of the Sami 
people justifies this extra political influence. What problems can it make for the Norwegian 
democracy? Why? And what can we do to make up for these problems? The direction of the 
dissertation may depend a little on the exploring of the literature, at the beginning of this 
work, I indeed know little about the problems with the double votes. Maybe it doesn‟t create 
notable problems? The general view is that it creates no notable problems at this time; 
although the extra democratic channel is of course a problem for someone who sees the issue 
purely from a point of view of principal. 
   Can notable problems arrive in the future? The answer may be yes. This is simply because I 
believe that the Sami parliament could achieve significantly more power in the future, and 
because it could involve many more voters. The dissertation is intended to have a somewhat 
futuristic approach. 
   Furthermore, this is to be an almost entirely theoretical thesis, involving the theory of 
democracy, as stated, and not a field work. Works done by others on the issue will be 
addressed, and supplemented with discussions and analyses. There will be no interviews 
carried out, and no Statistical data collected, although this could be useful in some ways 
(opinion polls, election data etc). Interesting results may still be discovered in such materials. 
6 
 
   The issue that the thesis concentrates upon has not previously been the subject of serious 
study as far as I know. Some minor discussions do however exist. This will be addressed later 
in this chapter. As no major work has yet been carried out on this issue, the theme is a more 
interesting topic of research. And as I said, it may be important in the future, when it could 
present significant democratic challenges and problems. Today few would deny that the 
institution is almost only a symbolic one.  
   The research question that the dissertation has to answer is defined as follows: “Which 
democratic-theoretical problems could double Sami votes create? If it creates unjustifiable 
outcomes, what can then be done to make up for the negative effects?” In simpler non-
academic terms, one may ask if the Sami people have too much power in Norway: is a 
minority dominating the majority in this country? 
 
1.2 THEORETICAL INTEREST AND PRACTICAL RELEVANCE 
  What makes the issue interesting? The question of double voting in general, is not new, the 
problem has been worked on already in other contexts, such as the Scottish West-Lothian 
question (which I will look a little bit at later). As stated, I know of no other research done on 
the Sami parliament election context, apart from some minor discussions which will be 
addressed later. This is my main reason for researching this matter. I would like to state that in 
my opinion the Sami people in general should be regarded as well integrated in the 
Norwegian society of today (2010). A further discussion about this is unnecessary; however 
few could deny that Norway has few or no significant problems with the integration of its 
Sami community. The rights given to them, like the right to have their own parliament, should 
also be seen as a sign of goodwill from the country to this minority. We should also note the 
policy from Norwegian governments which was called “Norwegenising” 
(fornorskningspolitikk). This kind of policy arrived in the middle of the 1850s (NOU 2008: 5, 
ch. 6.4.3). The goal here was assimilation of the Sami people. This was especially achieved in 
regards to language, and the school was a primary arena for this policy. This policy was, 
however, geographically limited to Finmark and the northern parts of Troms counties. A 
policy of National Security has been presented by the Norwegian State as the reason for doing 
this. In a formal sense, the “Norwegenising” (making Norwegian) was abolished around 
1940, although it did continue in practice, and with political goals from the late 1950s. One 
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central way of continuing this policy was the banning of the Sami language in schools, 
alongside the Kven language (NOU 2008: 5, ch. 6.4.3). 
  Looking at the “Norwegenising” was necessary in order to make a contrast to the situation 
today, (where the Sami even have their own parliament) and to support the statement that they 
are well-integrated in Norway. However, in practical terms, I believe that several 
controversial issues may arrive in the future that could polarize the relationship between the 
Sami population and the others living in Norway. The development regarding indigenous 
peoples‟ rights may be believed to develop further in the coming years and decades. Further 
privileges would probably be given to indigenous peoples. Especially issues regarding 
language and the right to land and water could turn up on the agenda. 
   In this matter, we already have one important example to mention: the so called “Finnmark 
Act” (Finnmarksloven). This act provides the Sami people, alongside the rest of the 
population of Finnmark, the rights to land and water in Finnmark, involving an area which is 
bigger than the country of Denmark (Justice and Police Department). The reason for this law 
was to maintain the county´s nature in a balanced and ecologically sustainable way, and to 
obtain the goodwill of the county‟s inhabitants, (and especially the Sami culture and their 
reindeer husbandry), the use of the wilderness, business activity and societal life. The work on 
this law took as long as 25 years. Those familiar with Norwegian politics would agree that 
this law was, without doubt, controversial; and since we can expect similar (or even more 
controversial) cases in the future, many people in Norway could pay more attention to the 
privileges that the Sami people have regarding voting rights for their own parliament. It could 
be rational to believe that many Norwegians would regard the Sami parliament as a redundant 
institution. However, the establishment of this institution did in fact have the support from a 
large majority of the public opinion. 60,1% of them supported it, of which 40,2% where 
positive, 19,9% were very positive (NSD 2004). However, this could make little sense for a 






1.3 THE SAMI PARLIAMENT 
  The Sami parliament, (Samediggi in northern Sami language, Sametinget in Norwegian) was 
opened in 1989. It is located in Karasjok, Finmark, in northern Norway. Its own building was 
opened in 2000. The parliament is composed of 39 representatives from 7 constituencies 
across Norway (Samediggi online). It therefore follows a non-territorial administrative 
principle. The parliament handles every case that has particular connections to the Sami 
people. However, its power is still largely consultative. It has the right to consultation in cases 
where it is considered reasonable to do so. The Norwegian government is obliged by law to 
do such consultations, and there are established practices for this. As a parliament, (not a 
legislature due to its limited power) it has an executive body, the Sami Parliament Council 
(sametingsrådet), consisting of five members, elected by the parliament. In other words, the 
system is based on a parliamentary principle. It could be stated that a broad consensus exists 
in Norwegian politics concerning the justification of the institution, among the notable 
established parties; only the Progress Party have been, and still are, against it. 
   The Sami people are spread across the four countries of Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Russia. Both the Swedish and the Finish Sami minorities have their own parliaments in a 
somewhat similar way (their organization will not be addressed here). The Sami parliaments 
in the three countries and the Sami‟s in Russia have an established cooperation, the Sami 
Parliamentarian Council, which seeks to address issues regarding the Sami people across the 
borders (Samediggi online). The fact that the Sami‟s are covering four countries is of some 
interest to us; a discussion about creating a single Sami parliament could perhaps be on the 
serious agenda in the future. Another issue that people outside of the Nordic and/or the Sami 
societies may address is that of Sami independence, a Sami state. This is however a purely 
meditative standpoint. 
  One of the most important factors about the parliament for this dissertation is the provision 
given for those who are able to vote in the elections. As said, there exists a Sami census in 
Norway. Every Sami above 18 years of age (and those who have their 18
th
 year birthday in the 
year of the actual election) can register in the census and then vote for the elections. The same 
provisions apply for Sami‟s from Sweden and Finland that have their address in Norway in 
the year of the election, and to those from Russia that have been living in Norway for three 
years. Furthermore, to registries in the census, the “candidates” have to declare:  
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 That they regard themselves as Sami 
 That they use the Sami language as their language at home, 
  Or that at least one of their parents, grandparents or great grand parents have or had 
Sami as their language at home 
 Or that they are children of someone already registered in the census 
  The census is connected to the public register and the addresses of the actual people in the 
election year. They don‟t need to register themselves again if they were in the census under 
the last election. Notable barriers can‟t be said to exist for registration, a registration form can 
be found on the website of the Sami parliament (Samediggi online). 13890 individuals were 
included before the 2009 election (Samediggi online). The census has increased steadily since 
its creation and is believed to continue doing so; it could potentially get much larger. The 
election occurs at the same time as the Norwegian parliament (Stortinget) elections, every 
fourth year in early September. The turnout in 2009 was 69, 3 % (SSB online). 
 
1.4 FORMER RESEARCH ON THE FIELD 
   As stated, as far as I know, there hasn‟t been done serious research about the issue regarding 
the “double Sami votes”, its problems, challenges and solutions. However, it has been 
mentioned in some works. 
   In the text”The legitimacy basis for Sami rights” (”legitimitetsgrunnlaget for samiske 
rettigheter”) (2009), Jarle Weigård addressed the issue of Sami/minority rights in general, as 
well as the problems with permanent minorities. For those familiar with democratic theory, 
and minority rights, this problem should be a well-known one. The case of Northern Ireland, 
with its protestant majority and catholic minority is something we don‟t really need to 
mention. In the context of the thesis, such a problem is solved, with the establishment of the 
Sami parliament that by intention should have power over matters that were considered 
important to the actual minority. One wouldn‟t expect such a problem should exist for these 
people. The limited power of the assembly, can perhaps be seen as some proof that the 
problem still exists (this will not really be addressed in this thesis), but it probably can‟t be 
said to be significant.  
10 
 
One main problem that could be discovered has in fact an opposite effect, namely that of a 
minority, by way of an extra democratic channel for themselves, overriding the majority, so 
we get a permanent negative majority. The size of a minority should be taken into account 
when choosing a model of power-sharing for a minority. The catholic minority in Northern 
Ireland was much larger than the Sami minority in Norway (the Sami census has been 
addressed), and would therefore without doubt have a stronger voice, while a smaller minority 
in a country should probably not need the right to power-sharing in the national government 
(Weigård 2009: 31-3). 
   When especially addressing the problem with “double Sami votes” Weigård wrote that the 
numerical overrepresentation of the Sami‟s was easy to justify due to minority visibility. But 
for the fact that the non-Sami political influence was made through one channel, when the 
Sami influence was made simultaneously through two channels, in the same issues, a 
principal normative justification for that couldn‟t be found.  A good practical example of this 
could be seen in the elections to the board of the “Finmark Estate” 
(Finnmarkseiendommen).The members of this council where elected by the members of the 
Sami parliament, and by the Finmark county council. The non-Sami population only has one 
electoral channel, the county council, while the Sami voters have both that channel and the 
Sami parliament. A Sami-friendly but non-Sami Finmark voter could think that it is ok that 
this group of voters (indirectly) choose members for the Finmark Estate alongside the Sami 
community and that they have equal representation. But he would probably not agree to the 
fact that the Sami alone choose the people on their side of the table, whilst also having 
influenced who‟s sitting his group‟s side of the table. Weigård writes that more justifiable 
solutions can be made, but it is not worth it since the Finmark Estate (and a similar proposed 
board in Nordland/Troms) are actually meant to be arenas for cooperation (Weigård 2009: 45-
7). 
   The problem of the double votes extends far beyond this; it could be related to every type of 
cases, and it would increase in importance when the Sami parliament increases its power. We 
could indeed establish a new non-territorial administrative unit to eliminate problems with 
double votes; but we then get the serious problem with the fact that it would probably claim 
power over issues that are divided between different administrative units. As this seems to 
make complications, we have to ask whether or not we have a notable problem with double 
votes. Weigård then looks to the United Kingdom with its West-Lothian Question. There, the 
11 
 
electors of Scotland can vote alone for the Scottish parliament, while simultaneously vote for 
elections to the British parliament, England doesn‟t have its own parliament. The problem 
isn‟t considered to be very large over there, but it is heavily debated. Weigård`s opinion is 
that we could get a problematic development locally in Finmark when the Sami parliament 
gets more power (Weigård 2009: 47-9). 
  Anne Julie Semb (2009) also writes about double votes, before that she addresses what she 
sees as a Sami parliament with power over an increasing amount of political issues. She also 
addresses the case of the Finmark Estate. Her opinion is that the Sami are given an additional 
political membership which is hereditary based, and that they thereby have an extraordinary 
political influence. Further increased powers to the Sami parliament are considered as likely, 
especially in terms of controlling natural resources (Semb 2009: 166-7). When discussing the 
double votes, she talks about what is called the “people-to-people approach” that seems to 
take into account that the Sami should be regarded as a group with a hereditary basis, but at 
the same time it doesn‟t see that the Sami are also Norwegians with the full rights this 
involves. The one people are, in other words, fully a part of the other. She says that the more 
the relationship between the Sami parliament and Norwegian government institutions are 
consultation-based, the more difficult it would be to argue in favor of the opinion that the 
Sami do not have double votes. The membership of the Finmark Estate is something she 
believes to show the challenges facing us (Semb 2009: 171-2). 
 
1.5 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
As stated, this dissertation seeks to analyze the question of “Sami double votes” from a 
perspective of democratic theory. By votes, it is important to underline that this will not be an 
exploration of election researches, although it may be of some help. Initially, it could be said 
that the double votes are entirely non-democratic, in relation to the principle of one man, one 
vote. Therefore, we need to define the term „democracy‟; finding the theoretical basis for the 
electoral rights. In the theory chapter minority rights would addressed. Classics in the fields 
will be used, such as Will Kymlicka. The Sami context will only be touched upon briefly in 
the theory chapter, while focusing upon related theory, namely minority rights and justice 
theory. The Sami context is primarily a task for the analytical chapter. Comparative 
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perspectives shall be included; firstly, the Scottish West Lothian Question relating directly to 
double votes, secondly Sami‟s in Sweden/Finland and their similar parliaments. 
   Regarding minority rights, Multicultural Citizenship by Will Kymlicka will be important, 
because it is probably one of the best books regarding arguments on the grounds that minority 
peoples deserve rights. Another book, where the same author is the editor, will be used to 
some degree, namely, The Rights of Minority Cultures. This literature does not directly 
complement the literature used in this introduction chapter, but addresses the theoretical 
approach chosen for this thesis. Other sources will be analyzed regarding the comparative 
perspective with the West-Lothian question; in order to reveal any elements of interest in the 
debate, relating to the question in theory. Language barrier problems are relevant for studying 
the Norwegian Sami political environment, where both the Norwegian and the Sami language 
are in use. 
   The above mentioned books should be seen as a “core” for the theoretical approach. They 
shall also be seen to explain the reasons for giving rights to minorities. A description of the 
minority rights, especially the right to representation, and the arguments in favor of them will 
be addressed in the theory chapter. In accordance with common practice in a master‟s thesis, 
the context, regarding Sami double votes will not be discussed on a general level there, this 
context will be used in the chapters of analysis. The literature mentioned covers the 
theoretical level in general. Furthermore, some sources will be used which draw on the Sami 
context, to give a practical understanding in the analysis chapters. One main problem with this 
thesis is the lack of former studies that could be related directly to the context. The articles by 
Semb and Weigård however do relate to some degree, and should bee used as well as 
possible. 
   Although it could be argued that more theoretical approaches could be added, I consider the 
minority right approach to be sufficient. This is mainly due to limitations of a defined length 
of the dissertation. Another approach of (social) justice theory was also considered. The right 
to “vote double” could be regarded as a question of justice, and theoreticians such as Rawls, 
Nozick and Hayek could be somewhat useful. However, it was ruled out in the analysis. Since 
a main claim in the text would be that increased division or splitting could arise from the 
double vote problem, one relevant approach could be concerning how conflicts between 
groups are developed. This is however, seen to be far too broad an approach for a thesis of 
this length and depth.  
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1.6 METHODICAL PROCEEDINGS 
  This thesis is a literature based (qualitative) study; literature exploration and theoretical 
reasoning will be the basis. From a futuristic perspective, it will be looking at the notion that 
the Sami Parliament could get increased power. When describing the situation today, a 
somewhat more practical approach will be used, e.g. by using practical examples of situations, 
like that of the Sami language, and along with quality-assured opinion polls and election data. 
   Some methodical principles are reasonable to adopt; one of them would be to create some 
future scenarios. This would be a case of imagining what could happen if the Sami Parliament 
was to become more (and much more) powerful. As stated, it is rational to believe that could 
happen. What would happen if controversial legislation regarding Sami rights were 
introduced in the future? How about future development regarding the Sami language and the 
reindeer industry? What if the Sami Parliament obtains more power, or all the power 
regarding this issue? Would there then be more conflicts with the rest of the Norwegian 
society? Another scenario could be a future government (like one consisting of the Progress 
Party) attempting to reverse Sami rights. 
   In other words, it will be a methodical principle to do a little creative speculation, with 
however, support of some sources. It would be helpful to use media related sources to predict 
the development. Helpful instruments regarding predictions would also include opinion polls, 
to see tendencies, if they exist for the case.  Such polls would be quality-checked to some 
degree, and newspaper articles used with caution. 
   When addressing the comparative approaches, it should be a methodical principle to make 
comparisons wherever practically possible. In regards to the Scottish West-Lothian question, I 
would address the double votes in general, but the relationship between Scotland and the rest 
of the UK probably can‟t be compared to that between the Sami‟s and the rest of the 
Norwegian population.  
   When addressing the Sami parliaments in Sweden and Finland, it should be remembered 
that they probably have a weaker position in their respective countries. As stated earlier, 
language barriers could make some limits to the available sources, but it will then become a 




 Introduction (including a minor methodical section) 
 Theory 
 Analysis 1 
 Analysis 2 
 Conclusion 
 References 
A separate methodical chapter was found to be unnecessary because the dissertation deals 
almost exclusively with theories. The analysis chapters are without doubt the most important. 
As for the last chapter, it is named “conclusion” because a visible conclusion is found; 
otherwise it would have been a summary chapter. A solution with two analysis chapters was 
seen as a rationale solution where the first one centers around the problems, while the other is 
focused on solutions. 
   The chapter on theory opens with some definitions and descriptions about minorities. Since 
the term minority could mean many things, it is of interest to give some perspectives on what 
the term could include, literally, everything below 50% could in fact be seen as a minority. 
This will be followed by a look at the difference between individual and collective rights, and 
then the question of why groups should be given rights. The self-determination rights in 
particular will then be addressed.  Specific descriptions about the two analysis chapters will 
be found in their introductions, as those chapters should be viewed as the most important. The 
conclusion will be divided in four parts. The first one goes back to the research question, and 
summarizes. I shall then ask whether the double vote problem really is of principal or 
practical importance. I have tried to decide how much of a problem it really is and to attempt 
to suggest a solution. Finally, the last part of the dissertation will be a recommendation 











The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and explain to the reader, theory which will be 
used in the thesis. The context of the problems concerning double Sami vote, will not be 
specifically addressed, although it can be linked when the author see it as appropriate. This 
theory chapter is centered on minority rights, the main theoretical approach for the 
dissertation. 
 
2.2 BEING A MINORITY 
What is a minority? What do people first think about when they hear the term minority? Most 
literally speaking, to many, it would be those who are outnumbered; a minority is the opposite 
of the majority. However, we need a more precise definition. In fact, the term can mean a lot 
of things; a dictionary gives the following definitions:   
1. a. The smaller in number, of two groups, forming a whole. 
   b. A group or party having less than a controlling number of votes. 
2. a. A racial, religious, political, national, or other group thought to be different from the      
 larger group of which it is part. 
 
   b. A group having little power or representation relative to other groups within a society. 
 
   c. A member of one of these groups. 
 
3.  Law The state or period of being under legal age: still in her minority. 
  (Free Dictionary by Farlex, online) 
   In other words, the term can be misunderstood. The definition 2.a is the most relevant in 
terms of what we are looking for. The definition 2b can make sense; however, it is rational to 
think that being a minority says little about the power this minority possesses. The definition 
2c is not wrong either, however, the chapter shall talk mainly about the groups rather than the 
individuals. It would be very difficult to mention every group of people that can be defined as 
a minority. Norway has the following five national minorities: Kvens (people of Finnish 
descent in Northern Norway), Jews, Forest Finns, Roma and Romani people/Tater (ministry 
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of Government administration, reform and Church affairs, online). Those who are observant 
would see that the Sami people aren`t mentioned here. This is because they are in fact a 
national minority, but they are also an indigenous people in relation to public international 
law, this means that a different protection is required for them (NOU 2008:5, ch. 8.1.1). Since 
this thesis is related to the Sami people this fact is useful to remember.  
   Can status as an indigenous people, as a pose to a minority group status, alone be a reason 
for the right of a greater, or more significant political influence? We shall try to address that 
later, however, it is found to be most useful to use the term minority in most cases from now 
on, despite the differences, mainly because it‟s simpler, and the arguments for favor and 
against political influence are mostly overlapping.  
 
2.3 MINORITY IN THE LARGER SOCIETY 
What problems could minorities meet in a country? It‟s fair to say that the conditions for 
minorities probably vary a lot between different countries and regions. However, what they do 
have in common is that they often speak a different language to the majority in the society, 
and have for example, cultural and religious differences. It can‟t necessarily be said that they 
are poorly integrated in the society just because they are different. However, by looking at 
statistics, concerning their participation in politics, an image is easily formed of minority 
groups and their participation in what should be regarded as one of the most important areas 
of belonging to “the larger society”. There are rarely legal barriers to such participation for 
individual members of minorities. Despite this, a number of examples illustrate how the 
minorities are clearly underrepresented: Afro-Americans in the US comprise about 12.4 % of 
the population; their amount of elected officials is only 1.4%. Among the Hispanic people in 
the same country, they constitute 8% of the population, their percentage of elected officials is 
only 0.8. Among aboriginal peoples in Canada their amount of the population is 3.5%, in the 
national assembly they have 1% of the seats (Kymlicka 1995: 132). 
   What does this tell us? Maybe that minority membership gives you a disadvantage, despite 
the state seeming to treat you in the same way as the members of the majority. Therefore, it‟s 
possible to conclude in a way that equal rights, and being treated like the same, aren‟t enough 
for minority-group peoples. The state has to give you something in addition to rights of 
equality. Or maybe it tells us that members of minority groups are weaker, because there are 
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groups in what could be called “the larger society” whom are also underrepresented. In 
Canada, women constitute above 50% of the population, in the national assembly they hold 
only 13% of the seats, and even this is better than in many other western countries. 
Economically disadvantaged peoples, and those with disabilities also have problems with 
getting into office (Kymlicka 1995: 132).In other words, legislatures seem to be 
unrepresentative even among the ethnic majority-population. It could therefore be concluded 
that the negative factors for representation in general, maybe strengthened in connection with 
minority-group people - at least without some compensatory strategies being implemented. 
2.4 INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 
By rights in this context, I still mean minority rights. Individual rights are those many would 
regard as a phenomenon in liberalism. Collective rights, (which can be considered a 
phenomenon appearing when dealing with minorities), would then logically be the opposite 
thing of individual rights. However, Kymlicka tells that this is a misperception. Many forms 
of group-differentiated citizenship are consistent with liberal principles of freedom and 
equality. The nature of group-differentiated citizenship has undergone some popular 
misunderstandings. One especially interesting thing to note is that the category of collective 
rights is large and heterogeneous; it includes rights of corporations and trade unionists, to 
bring class-action suits and the right to clean air. These rights have little in common and 
group-differentiated citizenship and the many forms of collective rights can‟t easily be 
combined. Many would think that collective rights are exercised by collectives, while 
individual rights are claimed by individuals. These assumptions apply to a few forms of 
group-differentiated citizenship, and the connection between individual rights and group-
differentiated citizenship are in fact a complicated issue (Kymlicka 1995: 34-5). 
   Firstly, there are internal restrictions and external protections. A minority group can raise 
two types of claims: the first is against other members of their group, the other one is (with 
the group) against the larger society. Both of these claims are labeled as collective rights, 
however, they have little in common. When talking about the claim of a group, this claim can 
in fact be about restricting the internal freedom inside the group. Several examples can be 
mentioned, one could be that a Muslim in the west claims the right to introduce religious laws 
in a geographical area. In such a circumstance the group can get a right, but individuals who 
don‟t wish to live under such laws get their rights violated. Another mentioned example by 
Kymlicka is the Apartheid system in Southern Africa. However, collective rights don‟t need 
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to be about such things, giving special representation rights, land claims and language rights 
can‟t be regarded as giving them the opportunity to dominate other groups and is therefore 
maybe purely positive (Kymlicka 1995: 35-6).                                                                      
   The second element in the relationship between group-differentiated citizenship and 
individual rights is the ambiguity of collective rights. While the collective rights term is in 
little doubt seen as a complicated issue, a deeper problem is that it suggests a false dichotomy 
with individual rights. Almost everyone has to agree that collective rights are not individual 
rights. However, many forms of group-differentiated citizenship are exercised by individuals.          
   One example is drawn from the French-speaking peoples in Canada; the right to speak 
French in federal courts is given to and exercised by individuals. In contrast, the right for the 
francophone people to have their children in French schools is exercised by individuals, but 
only where numbers warrant. The rights for Indians to hunt and fish are usually exercised by 
the tribe/group, and their council often decides when such things can occur. We even have a 
fourth case, preserving and promoting Quebecoise culture is a matter for the province of 
Quebec, many inhabitants here speak French, but a minority have English as their language 
(Kymlicka 1995: 45). All of these nuances create an image, illustrating how complicated this 
issue of individual and collective rights actually are. Therefore these terms have to be used 
carefully: misunderstandings often occur. If we then ask whether fairness between members 
of different groups is dependent upon group differentiated citizenship, the answer may well be 
yes (Kymlicka 1995: 47-8).  
 
2.5 WHY GIVE RIGHTS TO GROUPS? 
As mentioned, there are many nuances regarding this issue, it‟s not as straight forward as it 
seems on the surface. However, since Kymlicka (1995: 47-8) thought that group-
differentiated citizenship is required, let‟s find out why. What does a group-membership give 
an individual that he/she wouldn`t have got alone? Frankly speaking, such a membership can 
give the individual even less freedom than he/she would have got without the group 
membership. This is because, as aforementioned, a group can be deeply illiberal, and basic 
individual rights can be violated. This can occur by giving groups the rights to make laws for 
its members; but also in less formal ways, it is probably enough that the leaders are 
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authoritarian in their ruling, and that the individual members have no alternative ways of life 
in practical terms.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
    However, Kymlicka is of the opinion that culture is a very important aspect in this context. 
The freedom for individuals can actually be expanded by making minority rights, because of 
the connection between freedom and culture. It is however essential to define the type of 
culture we are discussing; the term can in fact include everything from teenage gangs to 
global civilizations. Here he is describing so-called societal cultures, and this kind of culture 
is providing its members with meaningful ways of life, across a full range of human activities. 
Both the private and public sphere is included, within religious, recreational, economic, 
educational and social activities. However, shared languages and territorial borders have to be 
defined. In other words, it often means a Nation State.  
   This culture is connected to the everyday life of its members, but it hasn`t always existed; it 
is a result of modernization. For example, the education system is important in the making of 
such a culture, and therefore connecting it to modern times. Why does this culture have to 
exist? It is necessary for the modern economy to work. It is also essential for the high level of 
solidarity which a modern democratic state has, and is also probably necessary for the 
Welfare State to function. A common identity and common membership is needed, people 
have to sacrifice themselves for each other, and they need to require elements like a common 
language and history.  
   However, Kymlicka`s mentioning of a welfare state is an issue I want to comment upon. A 
state is not necessarily a welfare state. Although the issue doesn‟t require a deeper discussion, 
few would deny that the US can‟t be said to be a real welfare state, compared with western 
European states; yet it can`t be denied that the US have some kind of minority rights (e.g. 
Indian reservations). In other words, a societal culture with common identity and common 
membership can make the foundations for a Welfare State, but not necessarily (Kymlicka 
1995: 75-77).    
   But, going back to the societal culture: if one such culture extends through the whole 
country, then there exists only one such culture in a country. The US can be said to have such 
a single “cultural structure” based on the English language. This is both true and untrue, far 
from everyone living in the US shares this culture, but it has however included a great array 
of different groups. It can be said that the country has a dominant culture alongside minority 
cultures. Immigrants to the US bring with them the shared vocabulary of tradition and 
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convention, but the social practices which those vocabularies originally referred to and made 
sense of are something the immigrants have left (Kymlicka 1995: 75-77).  
   The US does indeed have such minority cultures, which were institutionally established 
without connection to the Anglophone culture. These groups didn`t always get the rights to 
preserve their own culture. Despite enormous pressure to assimilate, they were determined to 
keep their cultural existence (Kymlicka 1995: 79).                                                                                                                                                                
   But does a minority culture have its own value? Why can‟t the minority cultures just 
disintegrate giving the members access to the majority culture instead? Do they need access to 
their own culture? Kymlicka suggests that the state could subsidize minorities to learn the 
majority language and history. This way of losing its culture would be similar to people losing 
their jobs. Giving language training to members of a dying culture is like offering workers 
retraining projects for those employed in a dying industry. An important question however, is 
why help a minority culture when we can help the members to find another. There are always 
people, who move between cultures, but this is still rare, it‟s costly, and there would always 
be some members of a minority whose integration is practically not possible. The integration 
is rarely easy, even where it‟s possible, and should people be required to pay such costs, 
unless they choose to do so voluntarily?  
   The costs should be considered for both parts, the members of the minorities and the 
majority. The costs for the first group can be time, frustration and maybe money, for the 
latter, almost certainly taxpayers money, and to others maybe a lot of other problems. Even 
where the obstacles to integration are minimal, the members of the minority have a very 
strong desire to maintain their cultural membership; it‟s the same for majority population 
members. From a minority people perspective, leaving their own culture can even be seen as 
analogues to choose a wow of cultural poverty and enter a religious order! (Kymlicka 1995: 
84-6).                                                                                                                                                                
      More systematic arguments in defense of minority rights can also be found. The first one 
is regarding equality. Many defenders of minority rights think that they are necessary simply 
to maintain the issue of equality. Group-specified rights are needed to accommodate 
differences. However, this is only valid up to a point. If a group claims rights, it is often 
because they want to oppress and dominate others. But some minority rights, however 
eliminate, rather than create inequalities. If they are outvoted on issues that are crucial for 
their cultural existence, this becomes an inequality. The majority population doesn‟t have to 
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be afraid of such a threat. The minority right could indeed make problems for the majority 
population members. Perhaps their fishing or hunting is limited, but such sacrifices are far 
less than they would have been without such rights (Kymlicka 1995: 108-9). 
    It is acknowledged that everyone has make sacrifices to make things function. The Second 
argument for the rights concerns historical agreements. Minority rights are often the result of 
such agreements. This could be treaty rights of indigenous peoples, but it can also be 
federative agreement between two people. It‟s important to consider the fact that such 
agreements were often ignored or repudiated. Could that be a better reason to strengthen this 
argument? Making argument against such agreements is not difficult; the agreements can be 
outdated, given by unelected people or in unpleasant, unacceptable ways. However, the 
majority population in a country often obtained control over the minority population in an 
unjust manner. The ways in which minority groups were incorporated into a larger state, 
alone, often gave them rights. Some group rights would often exist to those incorporated, 
historically,(whether the incorporation was voluntarily or not), either in judicial or moral 
terms (Kymlicka 1995: 116-7).      
   The third argument concerns the value of cultural diversity. Here, the protection of minority 
rights is seen to be in the interest of the whole society, an enlightened self-interest. It`s in the 
self-interest of the majority. The cultural diversity is said to be valuable, both because it 
creates a more interesting world and because the alternative culture may contain ways of 
organization we may learn from; particularly in the case of indigenous people and the 
environment. However, many people in a majority society do not necessarily agree with this. 
In some cases we may even see the society polarized. The problem with this is that the 
diversity within the majority is spread thinly and widely, while the costs to the majority can 
be quite high. Another question about is whether it is justifiable to give the majority costs in 
connection with minority integration. Why shouldn‟t the minority itself carry such costs? 
(Kymlicka 1995: 121-2).                                                                
      The fourth argument involves the analogy with states. Normally, group-differentiated 
rights are linked with states, but there‟s an important paradox in this matter, because liberals 
talk about the respect for individuals. States give rights to individuals, in terms of citizenship 
and there are many countries in which a large number of people requesting citizenship are 
refused,a somewhat similar issue regarding being a Sami will be addressed later. We could 
solve this problem by removing all borders and/or making a world government, but this seem 
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like a very utopist way of thinking. As long as we handle people in terms of citizenship, we 
give group-differentiated rights; the equality of people becomes the equality of citizens 
(Kymlicka 1995: 124-5). In conclusion, I think all of these arguments in favor of minority 
rights and protection make it difficult to argue against them. 
 
2.6 WHY SELF-DETERMINATION RIGHTS 
While addressing several aspects of minority rights, it would be rational to write separately 
about those rights regarding political representation. The thesis context with the Sami 
parliament makes this useful. Arend Lijphart writes about self-determination in relationship to 
pre-determination. Lijphart makes three main points. The first one is regarding the 
consociation. These democracies are considered the solution to the problems that deeply 
divided societies are facing. This solution has been rediscovered and reused. Secondly, those 
principles much be thought of as broad guidelines that can be implemented in different ways. 
However, they differ in nature and merit and the different types cannot be recommended to 
different societies. 
   The third point is the most important: an especially important set of alternatives in applying 
convocational principles here is the choice between pre-determination and self-determination 
of our constituent groups in a power-sharing system. The group has to be the collective actors 
among the forces that share the power (Lijphart 1995: 275). 
     What is meant by self-determination and pre-determination? Self-determination refers to 
national self-determination. This implies that nations should have the right to form separate 
sovereign states, within an existing nation-state. This is indeed autonomy rather than 
sovereignty. With pre-determination, the groups that plan to share power are identified in 
advance. When talking about democracy in a culturally divergent society, some have 
expressed that it simply can‟t work. On the contrary, there are numerous examples of places 
where it does work. However, a multicultural, or plural, society has less chance of becoming 
successful in terms of democracy. If it functions, it would often not be a true democracy, 
because the groups (like in Northern Ireland) are practically excluded. More accurately, 
democracy in a deeply divided society may be possible, but it would be a consociation 
democracy. Different principles and variations exist (Lijphart 1995: 275-9): a grand-coalition 
system in a parliamentary or presidential system, a segmental autonomy (may or may not be 
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geographically based), proportional results (which may or may not be in proportional ways), 
and a minority veto (may be absolute or suspense), even varying between types of decision. 
Finally, the agreements setting up these minority solutions may or may not be formal. Seven 
arguments in favor of minority self-determination are given by Lijphart (1995: 283-86):                                                                               
     1. It avoids the problems of invidious comparisons and discriminatory choices. 
     2. It would often help smaller minorities in a country with two large segments. 
     3. Pre-determination may make the foundations for discrimination also against the 
members of different groups. 
    4. It gives equal chances also to groups and persons that reject the idea of a society 
organized on a segmental basis. 
    5. It is flexible, in contrast to a pre-determinative system where for example the strength 
between groups in parliament may be fixed. 
    6.  It often lets individuals decide group membership, which is important where groups are 
geographically concentrated and their members are mobile. 
    7. It may be a complementary method to pre-determination system, e.g. pre-determinative 
system for the larger group, and self-determination for the small(er) one(s). 
        The only listed drawback, however, is that it may create minority overrepresentation. 
However, the guaranteed minority representation, autonomy and perhaps veto are much more 
important than this (Lijphart 1995: 283-86). In other words, arguments in favor of self-









3. THE PROBLEMS WITH DOUBLE VOTES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This first chapter of analysis which addresses the problems with the double votes, after this 
introduction, will have one section about judicial issues regarding the Sami people; because 
this is seen as important in relation to the contents of the dissertation. The double vote 
problem will then be addressed as a principle, in order to avoid misunderstandings. I shall 
then look at the concept of voting, and what it means in relation to individuals and groups. 
There will then be a section about the ordinary political system in Norway in relation to the 
Sami people; the Sami have the same political opportunities in Norway as the other 
Norwegians, but in addition, they have an extra channel. A section about the Sami people in 
relation to the Norwegians would then follow, because of the importance of context-specific 
information. The arguments in favor of the right to a double vote and the problems 
surrounding it would then be looked at. Lastly, there will be some scenarios presented, where 
the Sami parliament has achieved increased power in some specific areas. This is because it is 
deemed as possible that the institution could become more powerful in the future, and make 
the double vote problem more apparent. I have chosen scenarios regarding tax power, veto 
power, control of the reindeer industry and Sami language power as rationale issues to 
examine. 
   After describing the Sami parliament in the introduction and exploring the minority rights 
in the theory chapter, I will now try to combine these phenomena to analyze the double-voting 
problem. As discussed in the introduction, the term minority can be misused. Although many 
Norwegians would probably regard the Sami as a national minority, they are in fact an 
indigenous people. This would maybe strengthen the arguments in favor of rights, and, more 
relevant for the thesis, the right to double voting. With this status, they should be regarded as 
a people who arrived in the actual territory first, and the Norwegian government should feel 
obliged to protect such an ancestral culture. However, this question will not be discussed any 
further and the dissertation will not make any distinctions between minorities and indigenous 
people‟s description. 
   Are there other context-specific issues that should be mentioned in the discussion about the 
extra political rights of the Sami people? As stated in the introduction, I regard this minority 
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as generally well-integrated. Few, if any, would say that Norway faces deep segregation 
regarding the relationship between the Sami and the others. However, when looking at the 
history of this minority in Norway, many interesting perspectives can be found. No questions 
would be raised concerning the fact that the Sami is a separate people. They had and have 
their own culture, language and other characteristics, but the development of minority rights 
for them could be seen as a development of the recent decades. The period when the state of 
Norway tried to treat the Sami exactly like Norwegians, called the “Norwegification” was 
described in the chapter of introduction. 
    Today, few would deny the infringement and injustice carried out against this people. This 
historical context could be taken into account in favor of rights for this people. However, I 
could describe the policy regarding this people in a long-term perspective as ambivalent. 
Various Norwegian governments have treated them unjustly, but far from as badly as they 
could have done, compared with innumerable examples from indigenous people around the 
world. One would expect that the historical circumstances for a minority people would be of 
significant importance for their chances of winning rights. This is probably true, but other 
important elements are public opinion in the country, (which will be addressed later), and 
judicial elements, like the ILO-convention no. 169. What does the international law say about 
the threatening of indigenous peoples? One specific and important judicial element for the 
Sami context is the ILO-convention. 
 
3.2 JUDICIAL ISSUES REGARDING SAMI RIGHTS 
The ILO-convention number 169 about indigenous peoples and tribal peoples in independent 
countries was ratified by Norway in 1990 (Ministry of government administration, reform and 
church affairs). The main principle in this convention is the indigenous people‟s rights to 
maintain and develop their own culture, and the duty of the governments to take measures to 
support this work. Interestingly, Norway was the first country to ratify this convention. It was 
also decided, that in regard to Norway, the convention should apply to the Sami people. 
Several clearly described rights for such groups are mentioned, also the right to establish their 
own institutions to speak on their behalf in relations with the governments (Ministry of 
government administration, reform and church affairs). 
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   In other words, there are international laws that give the Sami people the right to have their 
own institutions. Since Norway did ratify the convention at an early stage, the government 
must, without doubt, have known about these principles. We can therefore assume that the 
ratification was done as a sign of goodwill towards its indigenous people. The right to 
establish their own institutions to communicate with the governments alone says little. The 
article 6 seems to be of specific interest for the context of the Sami parliament. This reads as 
follows: 
1. In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall: 
(a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through 
their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or 
administrative measures which may affect them directly; 
(b) establish means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent 
as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective institutions and 
administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and programs which concern them; 
(c) establish means for the full development of these peoples' own institutions and initiatives, 
and in appropriate cases provide the resources necessary for this purpose. 
2. The consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall be undertaken, in 
good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving 
agreement or consent to the proposed measures. 
(Convention No. 169, ILO online) 
   The article section 1(a) seems to take for granted that a separate organ for the actual people 
exists. Since section (b) tells that they should be able to participate to at least the same extent 
as others, it seems to say that they certainly should have such an institution. This section 
seems to encourage the governments to use their goodwill to make the institutions as good as 
possible. When the section 2 talks about the objective of achieving agreement or consent to 
the proposed measures, this could be read in the way that the governments should certainly 
give the institutions the right of veto. However, taken into account that the Sami parliament 
has only consultative power, the possibility of a scenario where the Norwegian parliament 
gives it a varying degree of veto power must be assumed to change the situation clearly, and 
the double voting problem would probably become more visible to many. I will address the 
aspects of a potential veto power later. Another interesting (and opposite) effect is a potential 
termination of the Norwegian recognition of the ILO convention 169. 
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   Another judicial document which is interesting to look at is the constitution of Norway. 
When unfamiliar with this issue, one could maybe ask if the constitution really would accept 
such rights to a specific group, such as the present situation in the context of the Sami 
parliament. They could argue with the fact that a constitution usually has statements about 
equality, anti-discrimination and similar issues. The constitution also specifies that “the 
people exercise the Legislative Power through the Storting”, according to article 6 (Stortinget 
online) which could be used to question the legality of the Sami parliament. This makes little 
sense however, when we bear in mind that the Sami parliament is a consultative-based organ 
(it doesn‟t make laws). However, this may change if the organ is given increased power in the 
future, which is a distinct possibility. Many may wonder if the constitution has something 
specific to say about the Sami people. It does indeed have an article dedicated to this 
indigenous people that inhabit the country. The article 110a, which can be described as the 
“Sami article” extracts, read as follows: 
“It is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to create conditions enabling the Sami 
people to preserve and develop its language, culture and way of life.” 
(The constitution of Norway) 
   As mentioned above, the Sami people are here given some degree of protection, although in 
general terms. This should also be seen as a kind of goodwill from the state of Norway. 
However, the duty of giving them a representative organ is not mentioned. This would have 
been important in strengthening the arguments in favor of their rights to double voting, as the 
ILO convention should be seen as doing. It is not impossible that the existence of a 
representative organ would be described in this article sooner or later, changing the 
constitution requires (simplified) a two third majority in the Storting that is elected after the 
one in which the change has been proposed, according to article 112 (The constitution of 
Norway). One could also ponder upon the possibility that the Sami parliament could be 
regarded as a constitutional convention. The article was adopted in 1988 (Lovdata online) and 






3.3 THE PRINCIPLE WITH DOUBLE VOTES 
As stated in the introduction, it was very important to explain fully, the term”double Sami 
votes”; it means that the Sami people (depending on definitions) have a Sami parliament, an 
extra democratic electoral channel that non-Sami peoples are excluded from. This comes in 
addition to the other democratic electoral channels that they and other Norwegians have 
access to (municipalities, counties and the national legislature). In other words, the Sami are 
voting in elections in Norway in the same way as the non-Sami, with one exception: They 
have their own assembly reserved for themselves, while retaining every political right that 
they would have had as Non Sami. This is what is referred to as the double vote, (the right to 
vote double). It is not related to a system where different group of voters have different voting 
weights in the same election, as some may believe. 
   There are still context-specific issues that are important to remember. The first one is that 
the Sami parliament follows a non-territorial administrative principle. This is not especially 
related to the double votes, none the less it should be mentioned: if a territorial-based model 
had been selected, the issue would have got a more localized approach, but since Sapmiland is 
so large, it seems that this was difficult to select. Another issue is about the Sami parliament 
having issue-specific areas it has power over, compared to the areas which the other political 
organs in Norway, at various levels, have power over. This is important because the issues the 
organs have power over, could be completely separated between them, or they could overlap 
to various degrees. If the administrative and political issues had been completely separated, 
the double vote problem would not exist. As will be shown, the policy at the Sami parliament 
interacts with other political organs and units to various degrees. The possibility of 
completely issue-separated power will be addressed in the second chapter of analysis, but this 
should already be regarded as a purely theoretical possibility. 
   A practical impact, or significance, of the double votes, can be seen when the Sami 
parliament are consulting, or more importantly, negotiating, with other actors. In such 
processes, a negotiation table should be imagined. Those registered in the Sami census could 
vote in elections to the Sami parliament, but also in the other elections in the country, namely 
the municipality, county, and national legislature (stortinget) elections. The non Sami voters 
only have the last electoral channels. In other words, the Sami are sitting on both sides of the 
table. What should be remembered here is the “people to people” approach (Semb 2009: 171-
2). The one people are a completely integrated part of the other. This should easily illustrate 
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the double vote principle, but on theoretical grounds, it has to be imagined that the negotiators 
on the non Sami parliament side of the table are representing both of the voter groups, those 
on the Sami parliament side are of course only representing the Sami parliament voters. 
   Another aspect which needs to be clarified here is that of the different political levels, or 
more precisely, administrative units, that exist in Norway. Norway has three levels in this 
respect, the municipality, county and the state level. This isn‟t necessarily so easy, 
administrative and political issues could overlap in different ways. However, all of the three 
levels have democratically political bodies. Although there are discussions in Norway about 
dissolving the county level, a Norway without elected bodies at a lower level than the national 
one, should be seen as meditative. The scale problem in the Norwegian society makes this 
political organization necessary (Weigård 2009: 48). Some issues that the Sami parliament 
could (theoretically) be able to gain control over, like culture, health, industry and others, are 
divided between the three different administrative levels. The scale aspect isn‟t necessarily a 
problem in the much smaller Sami community, but it‟s still essential for the politics in the 
larger Norwegian society. 
   The problems with the different administrative levels could be one of the main reasons why 
the Sami parliament doesn‟t have a territorial-based existence; such an existence would have 
solved the double vote problem. However, the different administrative levels are important to 
address also with the non-territorial model that the Sami parliament are based on. The 
institution is still seen in relationship to the three administrative levels in the larger 
Norwegian society. In the examples of scenarios with conflicts between the Sami community 
and the Non Sami Norway, I will try to explain at what level it is relevant on the Norwegian 
side. However, with the term “double vote”, it could be said that the electoral channels, (other 
than the Sami parliament one), be regarded as a single one. This isn‟t necessarily a problem, 
but differences between the levels regarding potential conflict scales could be significant. At a 
local level for example, the non Sami and the Sami voter would have a higher chance of 
knowing each other. 
   When different administrative levels are seen as something that is complicating the issue, 
their responsibilities also make problems. The decision-making skill of the Sami parliament 
does not comply with that of one of the three different levels in the larger Norwegian society. 
If that were so, the Sami census voters could have been deprived their vote to this election 
(Weigård 2009: 48).As it is, the Sami voters would lose influence on the issues that these 
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Norwegian organs have power over them on. Another scenario is one where the Sami 
parliament is getting a power that corresponds to that of a county/regional level, but how 
could that work? Alternative ways of organizing the Sami political power don‟t seem to be 
easy to find.  
3.4 SAMI VOTING – AS A GROUP AND AS INDIVIDUALS 
In the theory chapter, the individual and collective rights were described. This could be 
important to connect to the Sami and their rights, specifically the extra political influence. 
Simplified, the Sami people are the collective group and the members are the individuals. 
Those who recognize themselves as Sami may differ in terms of daily life and practice, but 
this thesis is concerned with those defined by the Sami census, described in the introduction 
chapter. 
    The relationship between individual and collective rights was clearly complicated (as 
explained in the introduction). Firstly, collective rights weren‟t the opposite of individual 
rights. Although many would believe that collective rights were exercised by collectives and 
individual rights claimed by individuals, this isn‟t necessarily the case. In the Sami parliament 
context, the group members have the right to vote, but they are voting as individuals. It could 
be said that there are internal restrictions and external protections. A minority group can raise 
two types of claims: the first is against other members of their group, the other one is (with 
the group) against the larger society (Kymlicka 1995: 34-6). It would be easy to see that the 
Sami in this case are making a claim against the larger society, it could be said that they are 
claiming the right to talk seriously with the larger Norwegian society (the consultative power) 
and they are idealistically claiming the right to decide against it (they do not have veto power 
yet) on fields that they regard as important to them. However, it is less visibly apparent that 
they indeed also claim against each other. It could be difficult to see this, although their 
representative organ should be regarded as representing them against the rest of the 
Norwegian society, they have the right to vote for it, and that‟s done as individuals. It should 
be recognized, in theory too, that they as individual voters have different preferences.  
   Another aspect of the relationship between the collective and individual rights is, as 
mentioned, the ambiguity of collective rights. A problem is that it suggests a false dichotomy 
with individual rights (Kymlicka 1995: 45). As mentioned, collective rights are often 
exercised by individuals. But other rights could be collective and exercised by individuals, but 
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only when numbers warrant. The overlap between Sami language ability and the right to 
participate in Sami politics is interesting, bearing in mind that 13890 individuals were 
included in the Sami census before the 2009 election (Samediggi online). The overlap could 
cause problems for the double voting issue, I say that it would maybe create more polarization 
against the larger Norwegian society if it is strong; since the Sami public sphere would 
probably be more segregated from the Norwegian one and the Sami identity could be 
strengthened. However, they may then need the representative institution more. A lesser 
overlap, in contrast, could create lesser polarization, but may also weaken the legitimacy of 
their extra vote, since they then could be regarded as more integrated in the larger Norwegian 
society. 
   In general, it can‟t be said that the right to vote double is exercised by the Sami voters only 
where numbers warrant. This is because their parliament was given to them (although it could 
still be abolished). When they got the institution it should be seen, at least from a formal 
angle, as if the turnout should be irrelevant. However, the turnout must be seen as important 
for the legitimacy of this institution, and for the practical problems related to the double 
voting problem that the institution creates. I maintain that both lower and higher turnouts may 
create problems; a high turnout may polarize the climate between the minority and the 
majority, while a low turnout could undermine the legitimacy of the right to vote twice. In the 
2009 election, the turnout was 69, 3 % (SSB online). 
   From an objective perspective, commenting this turnout isn‟t easy. Whether a turnout 
should be regarded as low or high depends heavily on the eye of the beholder, and in what 
political culture that eye is located. However, I think it should be regarded as relatively high 
largely because the linking of the turnout to the fact that the Sami parliament only has 
consultative power. Indeed an amazingly large number of those eligible to vote, did utilize 
their right recently when reminding ourselves that the institution doesn‟t have real 
independent decision making power. On the other hand, since the Census registering was 
optional; an interest in the election could be expected from everyone who chose to register. 
When the power is expected to grow gradually (as I earlier stated is reasonable to believe) 
significantly more voters can be expected to arrive, both in the census, and on Election Day. 
Such a development should be seen as important for whether or not the double voting right 
becomes a serious democratic problem; but the power that the institution exercise in the 
future, should be regarded as more important for a potential Sami/Norwegian polarization 
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3.5 THE SAMI PEOPLE AND NORWAY`S ORDINARY POLITICAL 
SYSTEM 
Since I have argued in favor of a possible future polarization between the Sami people and the 
larger Norwegian society, based upon the right of the first group to double voting, why is it 
then of  interest to look at the participation of the Sami in Norwegian politics in general? The 
term “double voting” means an electoral channel in addition to the ordinary channel, but it 
should, to some degree, be seen in relationship to their practical use of the ordinary political 
channels. One might imagine that the Sami voters concentrate their interest on the Sami 
parliament and Sami politics; they may then be indifferent to the ordinary elections in 
Norway, even boycotting them. Such ideas are of little value to the context of this thesis. I 
myself stated earlier in the thesis, that the Sami people should generally be regarded as well 
integrated in Norway. In one of her articles, Anne Julie Semb wrote about “The Alienation 
hypothesis”. This hypothesis, by Alan Cairns, states that “alienation” from the domestic 
constitutional order is common among minority indigenous nations” (Semb 2010: 81). 
  It is very important to mention that (even several years after the establishment of the Sami 
parliament) there is still a significant lack of knowledge on this area I‟m trying to look at, 
(Semb 2010: 76). As a consequence, I have to use that which is in fact accessible. I think there 
are few people, who believe the Sami are alienated in the Norwegian political system, (or 
more significantly), the Norwegian society in general. But is that really true? Do Sami people 
trust the important societal institutions, to the same degree as the population in general? 
   Research (from 2006) has shown that they do. The Storting,(parliament) the government, 
the municipalities, the courts, public administration at both state, and municipal level have, in 
general, equal levels of confidence among the Sami, as in the population in general (Semb 
2010: 91, table 4.2). The defined groups were Non-Sami, unregistered Sami, and registered 
Sami. The only significant difference in confidence was, not surprisingly, the trust in the Sami 
parliament, in which the registered Sami had a much higher level of confidence (5,7 points) 
than the two other groups (3,2 points each). The larger Norwegian population has of course 
problems trusting an institution in which they can‟t vote, and at the present time has little 
impact on them. The low level of trust among the unregistered Sami was to be expected; they 
probably oppose the institution or have no interest in it.  
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   Another relevant objective should be the Sami people‟s participation in the ordinary 
political channels. Among those who were registered Sami, 88% used their vote in the last 
Sami parliament election, in which they alone could vote. However, in the last elections to the 
Storting, the Finnmark county council, and the municipalities, the turnout among the 
registered Sami was also significantly higher than that of the unregistered ones, as well as the 
Non-Sami (Semb 2010: 97, table 4.5). Other tables presented in the article (Semb 2010) leave 
little doubt that the Sami people are engaged in the general political system of Norway, at 
least to the same degree as the majority population. With such findings it would be reasonable 
to think of the “people-to-people approach”: the one people (the Sami) are fully a part of the 
other (Semb 2009: 171-2). The findings addressed here, show that this is not only in theory, 
but also in practice.  
   As a conclusion to this section, I would say that with such a clear connection between 
theory and practice, the double vote issue must also exist in practice. So far, I have argued 
that a powerful Sami parliament could lead to division between the Sami and the larger 
population. These findings should strengthen the argument; Sami voters are using their 
additional channel, but are still using the ordinary electorate channels at least to the same 
degree as the larger population.  
 
3.6 THE SAMI IN RELATION TO THE NORWEGIANS 
It‟s not impossible to speculate that the course of development regarding double voting could 
(in public opinion) be regarded as creating segregation; and some may even regard it as racist. 
The rights to land and water are an example. Although the public law could develop such 
rights to be acceptable from a legal perspective, I still believe that the public opinion could 
see it very differently. Even the situation of the minority double vote is a situation in which 
people are treated differently.  
   The most essential dimension to describe the relationship between the Sami and the larger 
Norwegian society is a cultural one. Kymlicka tells us that there is a connection between 
freedom and culture, and this has an impact: expanding minority rights could lead to more 
freedom because of this connection (Kymlicka 1995: 75). The kind of culture that is relevant 
is a societal one, a culture that gives meaningful ways of life to its members. There is no 
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doubt that there exists a Sami culture. Furthermore, language and borders are important to 
such cultures. The Sami language was addressed earlier, but although there are areas in 
Norway where there are many Sami inhabitants, no borders exist. Modern day development, 
like the educational system would be essential. As stated in the theory chapter, the societal 
culture should be regarded as essential for the modern economy to work. A society with a 
high level of solidarity and a welfare state would probably also benefit from this. Kymlicka 
(1995: 76-7) looked especially at the situation with the English language in the US.  
   Using the Norwegian-Sami context however, could be interesting. The languages of the 
Sami people were looked at in relationship to the Sami parliament elections. Those who meet 
a Sami would almost certainly be able to speak Norwegian with him, although he may also 
speak Sami. The policy of “Norwegification” (fornorskningspolitikk), which nowadays few 
would deny was unjust, was primarily carried out through the education system. It lasted for 
decades and tried, in accordance with its name, to remove that which could be called Sami. 
The banning of the Sami language in schools was a central method of implementing this 
policy (NOU 2008: 5, ch. 6.4.3). 
   How is this relevant for the societal culture and the decision for giving minority rights? 
When Norwegian authorities implemented the assimilation policy, they did in fact violate the 
Sami societal culture. The maltreatment of the Sami language and culture is indeed an 
argument in favor of the right to double vote, seen in the light of giving them justice on 
historical grounds. If that is a main reason for their rights, there seems to be a case for stating 
that the double voting problem in general, is something the larger Norwegian society has to 
live with. One could then ask the question if it‟s fair that Norway‟s future generations should 
pay for the maltreatment of the indigenous people in the past; while the present day members 
of the Sami people benefit from the fact that their ancestors were badly treated by Norwegian 
authorities. I don‟t think any good answers can be given here. The justice theorists (addressed 
in the theory chapter) like Rawls, Hayek and Nozick would probably have different opinions 
on this, but I think, it‟s difficult to argue in favor of double voting right on the grounds of 
reverting historical injustice. Although it may be possible in theory, the public opinion is 
likely to disagree with it, especially if the Sami parliament has visible, indirect power over 
them. 
   The US had minorities which where institutionally established outside the Anglophone 
language culture. They faced enormous pressure to integrate, but they did still determine to 
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keep their cultural existence (Kymlicka 1995: 79). This is an interesting comparison, it could 
probably be said that the Sami culture didn‟t, originally, have any connection to the 
Norwegian language. The similar pressure they endured to assimilate was addressed, but in 
the same way as their US counterparts, their culture survived, although it was probably much 
damaged. As the assimilation was unsuccessful, at least in terms of wiping out the Sami 
culture, this could create problems for the double vote right of this people. This is because 
bearing in mind that the policy didn‟t succeed; it is more difficult to argue in favor of rights 
on historical grounds. On the other hand, if it had succeeded, there may not have been a 
culture to protect and a minority people to give rights to. However, my main point is that as 
the Sami culture has managed to exist without the extra political rights, it is more difficult to 
argue in favor of them being needed. It could be argued, against the Sami parliament, (and the 
double vote right it contains), that the Sami culture would have existed anyway, and been 
clearly visible without it. 
   The problem here is still the legal dimension, since the rights, and also the rights to have an 
own representative organ was given on legal grounds; it‟s difficult for Norwegian authorities 
to oppose, although they could for example, terminate Norway‟s participation in the ILO 
convention. Whatever the legal dimension tells about rights, the public opinion could still be a 
practical problem. This is related to the legitimating of democracy, which is an important 
issue for this dissertation. As stated in the introduction chapter, the establishment of the Sami 
parliament is anchored in public opinion, with a 60,1% of support (NSD 2004). But then 
again, this is of little value, with the low level of power the institution has today. 
   Those in favor of the double vote right (and minority rights in general) for the Sami people, 
would perhaps focus on the costs that this people sustained during the assimilation period. 
This cost is probably impossible to estimate, but I myself would consider the very difficult 
school years for many youth belonging to this group, and the creating of bitterness against 
Norwegian authorities among other things. These hardship costs could indeed be weighed up 
against the costs of their political rights which could become very visible in the future. As 
said earlier, the double vote right was considered capable of creating division/polarization, 
(especially locally), and in the future.  
   Scenarios regarding increased power to the Sami parliament will be addressed later, but the 
attempt to weigh up these potential costs against each other has already created headaches. If 
we continue to make the Sami parliament stronger, the costs of polarization and division from 
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the larger society, may be necessary to accept. If we change back to an assimilating policy, 
the costs of making an entire minority group into a part of the majority has to be taken, (such 
as dealing with the problems for those who are unable to assimilate). Which is the most 
rational scenario is an open question, but either option would probably require controlled 
moderation. 
3.7 ARGUMENTS FOR THE DOUBLE VOTING RIGHT, AND THEIR 
PROBLEMS 
Four arguments were given by Kymlicka for minority rights in general. Equality was the first 
issue that we remember. A problem arises immediately from a simplistic point of view; 
increased inequality is already created when people are treated differently, and one group 
could use the rights to oppress and dominate the others. However, the problems that rights are 
creating have to be weighed up against the problems it solves. Group-specified rights could be 
seen as necessary to accommodate differences. If we see the Sami parliament as an institution 
where this minority is taking decisions on matters that are important to them, it could be 
rational to let them do so. This could probably work perfectly on many issues. The problems 
arise when decisions are taken that have a clearer impact on the majority population. 
Kymlicka (1995: 108-9) mentioned the rights to fishing and hunting. The future development 
regarding land and water rights, the “Finmark Act”, reindeer husbandry among others are 
issues that I believe, really could create significant division between the Sami and the larger 
population. Kymlicka does have good arguments, but they are separated from the public‟s 
opinion and reactions to them. Philosophical arguments are separate from the reactions, but 
those reactions which I believe could make polarization, are still a problem.  
   As far as historical agreements are concerned, it is more difficult to find arguments for the 
Sami context. The argument regarding cultural diversity is addressed earlier. The culture of a 
minority is something that could be seen valuable, although the majority may not necessarily 
agrees with this position. Democracy is, however, not always about the will of the majority. 
The question of costs for Sami double votes sustained by each part is interesting, but an 
answer would be difficult to estimate. When the government of Norway gave the Sami‟s the 
rights to decide for themselves, and to some degree, influence the majority negatively (in the 
light of a potential future polarization), they did actually agree to a situation where the 
majority had to take the costs of integrating the minority. Whether or not this is justifiable 
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probably depends on the eye of the beholder, however, if one agrees to basic principles of 
minority protection, I would think one would have no choice. 
   The last of Kymlicka`s general arguments in favor of minority rights was called the analogy 
with states (Kymlicka 1995: 124-5). This is related to the fact that the rights given by a state 
to its people are in the context of a citizenship. The interesting point here is that the Sami 
rights, and especially the political ones, are given to them by a definition which I believe 
could be comparable with citizenship. As addressed, the right to vote for the Sami parliament 
was granted by membership in an ethnically based census. The term Sami citizenship has 
indeed been used (Selle & Kristin Strømsnes 2010), and could be used here. This creates a 
problem comparable to a general citizenship case. This is because, in many countries, far from 
everyone who applies, or wishes to become a citizen gets their wishes granted. One could 
believe that there are people wishing to become a Sami (by census membership definition) 
who don‟t get their wish granted. They maybe don‟t have Sami ancestors, but they still feel 
themselves to be members of this indigenous people. They could have interests in the use of 
land, water, or reindeer husbandry among other things, that the Sami parliament have (and 
could be expected to get) power over. Or they may speak the Sami language and participate in 
that public sphere. No doubt, this is complicating the issue, when those who feel themselves 
to be, and maybe rationally should be able to become a Sami, are rejected. Then the double 
vote right, most probably on principle, could lose its legitimacy. Examples of people who 
were refused a “Sami citizenship” are, and will most likely remain, nonexistent.  
The second point was concerned with seeing the consociation recommendations as broad 
guidelines. This is interesting because the Sami political rights issue is, at least to some 
degree, a unique situation. Of course there are other situations where a minority is given their 
own assembly, but they may not tell us much about how to make a well functioning solution 
in Norway. Maybe the most similar cases are the situations for the Sami minority in Sweden 
and Finland, which seem to be somewhat comparable. I myself would imagine that a weaker 
position for those assemblies and the minorities‟ different numerical proportionality related to 
the majority are the main problems. Lijphart`s main point seems to be the including of all 
parts in decision making processes. This is being violated by the Sami parliament when it uses 
powers that make decisions only for themselves. Then again, to make a less divided society, 
solutions to better this problem have to be found. 
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   In any case, Lijpharts theory was most likely to have been related to larger minority groups; 
in cases of smaller minorities, such as the Sami, an institution would probably be chosen. The 
description of self-determination and pre-determination is more difficult than many might 
think. The self-determination term means that nations should have the right to form separate 
sovereign states, inside the existing nation state, which is really autonomy rather than 
sovereignty. With pre-determination, the group‟s plan to share power were identified in 
advance (Lijphart 1995: 275-9). There is no doubt about the group in the actual context. The 
self-determination term is therefore of most interest in the analysis. There should be no doubt 
that the Sami people are a nation, and not forming something inside the existing state of 
Norway either. Despite the fact that they could be said to have some form of autonomy and 
that they could get increased power in the future, it‟s still not possible to call this a sovereign 
power. As seen earlier, the rights and privileges given to this group aren‟t given indefinitely; 
if we remember, the ILO convention could (at least in theory) be terminated, and there is, as 
yet, no guarantee to the Sami parliament in the constitution of Norway, despite the fact that 
the Sami people were mentioned in a separate article. Therefore, the power of the Sami 
parliament is given them by the National Assembly and doesn‟t need to remain forever. Even 
if the constitution did secure it, the constitution itself could of course be changed. 
It is interesting, the fact that the power given to the Sami people, is not constitutional. If it 
becomes so, those of the majority facing significant trouble with the double vote issue may 
simply give up their political interest due to alienation. Then the Norwegian democracy, at 
least locally/regionally would be facing severe damage. If (a strong) power to the Sami 
parliament remains unconstitutional, but still creates division, a solution may still be the 
abolition or reversal of its power. If that should happen, one consequence of the double vote 
problem would be a step back for the rights of the Sami people. This could be regarded as 
highly speculative; however, it is still a situation worth pondering upon. As mentioned earlier 
in the dissertation, the policy regarding the Sami people, generally faces consensus among the 
established parties, the Progress Party is the marked exception. What if they get into power? 
   They would probably still be alone in their opposition to the Sami parliament, but a 
theoretical scenario where they form a majority-government with the Conservative Party 
could none the less be mentioned. As of early 2011, about three and a half years before the 
next Storting election (General Election), public opinion doesn‟t seem to be unfamiliar with 
the idea of a majority government consisting of a coalition between the two parties 
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(Dagsavisen online). I would think that the conservative party would reject proposals to 
abolish the Sami parliament and the minority rights. More importantly, it should be stated that 
the institution is in fact, still far from powerful enough to cause the division I have written so 
much about. However, developments like the Finnmark Act and scenarios that will be 
addressed later, do show tendencies. It should be seen as realistic that the possible future 
government (mentioned above) would at least slow down the expansion of power to the Sami 
parliament. In other words, reactions against the right of double votes for the Sami minority 
could be arising in the not too distant future. 
   Lijphart (1995: 283-86) gave seven arguments in favor of minority self-determination that 
should be connected to the Sami parliament context.  The first one, that it avoids the problems 
of invidious comparisons and discriminatory choices, is interesting if seen in connection to 
the position of the Sami people in Norway. There are many ethnic and cultural groups in 
Norway and deciding who should get more political influence isn‟t necessarily easy. As 
mentioned, Norway has five national minorities, whilst the Sami people are an indigenous 
people, which mean a stronger protection. I think few would find it unjust that the Sami get an 
extra voting channel while other groups, (like the five defined minorities), do not. This is 
simply because of the position of the Sami. Although there may still be claims of injustice and 
discrimination, there are at least decisions made about the model beforehand. The second 
argument that says smaller minorities would often be helped in countries with two large 
segments holds little relevance to this situation. The next argument was that pre-determination 
may lay the foundations for discrimination, also against the members of different groups. This 
was especially related to New Zealand and the Maori; this was solved by making Maori 
register registration optional, making it irrelevant with proportional representation. At the 
national level, Norway has the PR. Reserved seats for Sami in the Storting (parliament) have 
never been introduced, however, I think that this could have been even more controversial in 
public opinion than the right to vote double, due to the visibility of reserved seats at the 
national level. 
   Regarding the argument that it gives equal chances also to groups and persons that reject the 
idea of a society organized on a segmental basis (Lijphart 1995: 283-86), it could make sense 
if other groups, (like those not culturally or ethnically based), learned something from it. The 
fifth argument about the flexibility of self-determination versus pre-determination is of 
interest. One example of giving a specific number of seats in the National assembly of 
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Norway and, maybe also seats in the government could have been claimed instead of a 
minority assembly. Also the last proposal should be seen as much more controversial than the 
right to vote twice; because the double vote right was for a dedicated extra assembly. The 
argument about the individuals‟ rights to decide membership doesn‟t really apply for the 
context; people who wanted to become a Sami couldn‟t necessarily do so, although it‟s 
optional for those who can register, to do so. The Sami parliament wasn‟t territorially based. 
However, the rules about membership in the census may become more liberal later, although 
it is difficult to imagine a full option to every individual in Northern Norway, (which would 
have changed the double vote problem), and even more utopian, optional to the whole 
national population. The last argument about a complementary system, giving pre-
determination for the larger groups and self-determination for the smaller also makes problem 
for this dissertation, as long as ignoring a more unrealistic vision about a shared Norwegian-
Sami power in national government and dedicated to the very small other minorities, like the 
five national. 
   The only defined drawback for minority self-determination by Lijphart, were concerning 
minority overrepresentation. It is possible to talk about minority overrepresentation through 
the existence of a dedicated minority assembly where only the minority may vote. In other 
words, the only drawback was that drawback which this dissertation is seeking to address. 
And therefore, it has to be of significant importance in relationship to the arguments in favor. 
As of today, I would regard it as far from large enough, but as always, the problem may come 
in the future. Could some scenarios about future power to the Sami parliament be considered? 
  3.8.1 FUTURE SCENARIOS WITH INCREASED POWER TO THE SAMI 
PARLIAMENT 
As stated several times earlier, there should be little doubt about a possible development 
giving Sami parliament increased power. This should be seen as a factor which could bring 
the double vote problem on the agenda with increased relevance. Although the problem exists 
in principle already, the fact that the Sami parliament have only lesser and consultative power 
gives reason to believe that there isn‟t really much problem with the Sami having added 
influence at present. Discussing the problem in principal could be sufficient; however, I think 
that would have made the dissertation too narrow. Some speculation about future 
development therefore has to be undertaken. 
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   One specific development that has to be addressed is that of a possible veto power to the 
Sami parliament. With a veto power, an actor has the ability to say “no” to a proposal. In 
some way, it could be said that it exists already. Although consultations should be formally 
regarded as something different than a veto power, it‟s still a kind of power where the first 
part is expected to meet the other, at least to some degree. If imagining that the Sami 
parliament is negotiating with Norwegian authorities, it should be expected that some kind of 
agreements are made. In addition, the term “self-determination” alone could mean a veto 
power, although it could also mean the right to take decisions separately from the larger 
Norwegian society.  In other words, the problem with extra influence for the Sami people is 
already visible, although it could be small, even microscopic. 
   Another possible development is that of a Sami parliament which acts, in different ways 
more like the Storting. One example is the right to cede power. It has been stated that the right 
to self-determination also implies that the Sami parliament could cede decision-making power 
(Semb 2005: 533). This raises democratic problems; power could indeed be ceded to other 
actors, also those which are non-democratic. However, such abilities also apply to the 
National Assembly, which makes it a problem in general related to democracy theory rather 
than the double votes. However, if the Sami parliament became more and more similar to the 
National Assembly, the double vote right to the Sami should be expected to get more attention 
and make larger concerns, especially from the larger Norwegian opinion. It could perhaps be 
said that The Sami parliament could claim the Storting to cede power to them. This would 
then have much larger consequences; but it should be regarded as highly unrealistic. 
However, there could be speculation about situations where the majority in the Storting give 
the Sami parliament power, (at least in practice), whenever they are ask for it and maybe 
without serious concern for public opinion. This should also be regarded as unrealistic; 
however, lesser amounts of power could be enough to collide with the larger Norwegian 
society. 
3.8.2 TAX POWER 
One speculative development is that of giving the Sami parliament the power to claim taxes, 
in various ways. As of today, it has neither the power to do that, or to make laws. It‟s difficult 
to see how the institution could be able to get any kind of law-making power, and I don‟t 
know of any such proposals. However, the seed to taxation power has indeed been on the 
agenda. This was related to the work with the laws regarding minerals. The proposal from the 
42 
 
Sami parliament was that every mineral extraction in the traditional Sami areas should be 
covered by an indigenous peoples fee, which should be administered by the Sami parliament 
(Semb 2009: 169). The consultation processes related to this development, which were held 
between them and the Ministry of Trade and Industry were heavily criticized by the Sami 
parliament. Consultation procedures had been established after the passing of the “Finmark 
Act”. A proposal related to taxation, presented here, should no doubt, be regarded as 
controversial. With such a power, one could regard the institution as “a state within the state”, 
and cause concern within large parts of the public opinion. 
   Interestingly enough, the fee was supposed to cover the extraction in traditional Sami areas. 
These areas aren‟t always easy to determine. If we include the whole of northern Norway and 
recognize a border in the middle parts of Norway, (the Sapmiland definition), large parts of 
Norway, at least in terms of geography, will be included. If an area generally synonymous 
with the county of Finnmark is being used, the issue will have a more regional or local 
dimension. It‟s not easy to say what would make the most division among the Sami 
community and the larger Norwegian society. Mineral extraction is still an enterprise, a 
societal part which is not necessarily connected to individuals in the way that double votes in 
general are. However, the claim should still be thought of as a seed to a significantly stronger 
Sami parliament, which was my main concern for future polarization between the Sami and 
the larger Norwegian society, and the last word hasn‟t been spoken on this issue. As the Sami 
parliament thought that both the consultation procedure and the proposal itself was in conflict 
with the ILO 169 Convention, they wrote about their concern to the ILO in April 2009 (Semb 
2009: 169). When thinking about the purely judicial dimension regarding the rights of 
indigenous peoples, it shouldn‟t be a surprise if they got their will in this matter. Naturally, 
this would increase the power of the Sami parliament, and then probably make the rights for a 
double vote for the Sami people more controversial; because taxation power is a significant 
power. However, it‟s still not taxation of enterprises in general, in Sami areas, or (far more 
important) people. 
 
3.8.3 VETO POWER 
The possibility of a veto right is another development which could significantly increase the 
power of the Sami Parliament. It is worth speculating the chances of that happening, and it is 
reasonable to believe that notable parts of the Sami community want such a right; and that it 
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was seen (albeit unofficially) as a future rationale when the institution was established. Anne 
Julie Semb (2009: 170) studied the proposal to a Nordic Sami convention. She believed the 
article 16 in that convention to state that the Sami parliament should have a veto right above 
the storting in some circumstances. If that should happen, certain political processes will 
become negotiations between two actors. Which, and how many issue areas that are possible 
candidates to be covered by such negotiations, is not decided. However, if the areas that are 
important to Sami culture, enterprise, and societal life shall be covered, as the article 16 
stated, it‟s reasonable to presume that both the Sami language and the reindeer husbandry 
would be just such areas. And these are areas that I believe could create polarization between 
the Sami and the rest of the Norwegian society. I shall return to this later. 
   It is not necessarily easy to understand what a veto right really means. If the Sami 
parliament are given such a right, one could see a situation where the institution, (with the 
help of its ruling majority) vote “no” to a proposal given to them by the Norwegian National 
Assembly. Such procedures seem complex, and difficult to speculate upon. However, what 
could be expected to arise are negotiation procedures between the two actors. In such 
processes, unanimity is the rule, both parts have to agree, and that should be seen as the veto 
right. One of the problems with double votes was its threat to political equality. However, the 
proposed negotiation procedures and veto right, should be regarded where political equality is 
equality between two equal collectives, or “peoples” (Semb 2009: 170). It is not an 
uncommon situation in federal, or quasi-federal states, but still uncommon in Norwegian 
political life. The lack of tradition for such political processes could be a problem in itself, 
since political tradition should be regarded as important for the political development in an 
actual country. (This will not, be addressed in detail.) However, if the negotiations succeed in 
terms of being able to build political relations, there is still the problem of negotiations, as 
well as consultations, often being elitist, closed affairs offering few openings for outside 
influence. It is therefore far from a good solution (Weigård 2009: 49). 
3.8.4 CONTROL OF THE REINDEER INDUSTRY 
What if the Sami parliament becomes much larger or gains full control of the reindeer 
husbandry? This should be of specific interest because this enterprise is without doubt very 
important to Sami culture and tradition. Those outside the Sami community would probably 
often relate reindeer husbandry to the Sami. As of today, this enterprise is regulated by the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture in Norway and it‟s difficult to speculate on future 
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development in this area. Since it should be expected that the Sami parliament get increased 
power, it could also cover the reindeer husbandry. However, since this husbandry is so 
important to the Sami people, many could ask why it hasn‟t been managed by the Sami 
parliament ever since the establishment of that institution. The reason is that the enterprise 
itself seems to be against such a shift of management. 
   The Sami Reindeer Herders' Association of Norway was and is against such a move (Bjerkli 
and Selle 2003: 64).  When such an important issue is outside of the whole Sami parliament 
system, it‟s difficult to use it as an example of an area where increased power to the Sami 
parliament could create more polarization. Could it be that the administrative profession 
makes it simpler to include the enterprise within a Ministry? Or maybe the organization for 
those practicing the reindeer husbandry are in fact, aware of increased division between the 
Sami community and the larger Norwegian society? However, it‟s hardly feasible that they 
themselves don‟t view the husbandry in connection with a Sami approach. The organization 
does have this (Sami) in its name, and the reindeer is, almost exclusively Sami 
(Reindriftsforvaltningen online). 
   However, it‟s interesting to see how other parts view the connection between the Sami 
people and their, to them, important Reindeer husbandry. It has not been uncommon to 
present a Sami as being synonymous with „someone who practices reindeer husbandry‟ 
(Bjerkli and Selle 2003: 254-5). This is of course wrong, far from all Sami today are 
practicing this husbandry. Being a Sami isn‟t synonymous with being involved in the reindeer 
industry; but being involved in the industry is by far synonymous with being a Sami. This is 
what makes it so interesting to speculate about a future where the Sami parliament has the 
control of this enterprise, and the conflict it could create when those able to vote for that 
institution exercise double voting. Because there‟s no doubt that the reindeer enterprise is one 
that often comes into conflict with other enterprises, and other societal actors in general. 
Conflicts between reindeer husbandry and the agriculture industry are of interest here. In this 
situation, the double vote problem could be used more directly, although still theoretically. 
The policy regarding agriculture in general should be seen as controlled by the voters to the 
National Assembly. Every citizen would have the right to vote here, but in relation to the 
Sami parliament, (who now are thought of as controlling the reindeer enterprise), the Sami 
alone are able to vote. Since the husbandry was practiced almost exclusively by the Sami, it 
could be said that there are then no genuine double vote problems in this matter: the Sami 
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people would be voting on the composition of an organ, which handles an enterprise that they 
practice (almost entirely) for themselves. 
   But such a view should be seen to oversimplify the situation. There should be no doubt that 
the reindeer husbandry interacts with various kinds of societal actors. Innumerable examples 
exist, such as the grazing reindeer often cross property limits, roads and many other things. 
The coexistence with (the ordinary) agricultural enterprise is important. In this case, it is 
important to remember that a farmer could indeed also be Sami. This gives a practical view on 
“the people to people approach”, from the introduction; the one people (the Sami) are a 
completely integrated part of the other (Semb 2009: 171-2). So if thinking in terms of 
theoretical consultations/negotiations between the agriculture and the reindeer husbandry, the 
Sami reindeer part could be said to be sitting on both sides of the table. This could be seen to 
lessen the legitimization of such processes. In addition, non-Sami farmers could feel 
frustration concerning the fact that Sami parliament, (an organ in which they have no 
influence), makes all decisions related to reindeer and grazing (which has a significant 
influence on them). This should be considered to be a democratic problem, but is it one the 
farmers should tolerate for the sake of indigenous people rights? 
  One should also mention the feelings of the public opinion, which often show a lack of 
understanding for minority rights in general. For example, letters to the editor in Northern 
Norway newspapers on the issue of Sami rights, reindeer husbandry and similar themes, often 
seem to be unfair (Berg 2001). The practical difference between the rights of the Sami as 
minority people, and grassroots feelings among other Norwegians should be considered 
important, if trying to analyze challenges to democracy incurred by the double vote. Also the 
frustration among some actors, (often the Non-Sami), could be seen to create increased 
polarization with the Sami people.  
   What about the press? It is not only the public‟s thoughts on the issue we should be looking 
at. Interestingly enough, in the last half of the 1990s, several papers, especially in Northern 
Norway, did a lot of coverage on the debate about Sami rights to land and water. News about 
the important reindeer husbandry focused mostly on the problems in this enterprise (Berg 
2001:195-226). In conclusion, the press should be regarded as playing a major role in the 
debate about the development of Sami rights. They also have the power to sway opinion, and 
create negative feelings among the public in this issue: which strengthens my argument that 
increased power to the Sami parliament could increase polarization, especially locally in the 
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northern Norway, and Finmark. So, do the media take their responsibilities seriously? I think 
there are many nuances here, and there is work to be done, if an objective press in relationship 
to debates about Sami societies is an aim; as shown clearly by the examples of negative light 
being shed upon the reindeer enterprise, the press have work to do. 
  
3.8.5 THE POWER OF SAMI LANGUAGE  
Could the Sami‟s language play a significant part in dividing their people and the other 
Norwegians? Many local conflicts have arisen regarding the use of the Sami language, which 
gives reason to believe this is so. Typical examples include the question of whether or not 
road signs in a municipality in northern Norway should be bilingual. Several such 
controversies have been visible in the press and municipality councils for a long time. The 
situation in the municipality of Tysfjord should be familiar to many. Another more recent 
incident was the introduction of (bilingual) road signs in the city of Bodø, a city which few 
would regard as a pronounced Sami area. In this case, a Sami language sign was tagged only a 
few days after its presentation, accompanied by aggressive and unfair comments on the 
website of a local newspaper (TV2 nyhetene online). What makes such cases interesting for 
the future power of the Sami parliament, and the problems with the minorities double votes? 
In cases like this, the decision to put up bilingual signs could be seen as a sign of goodwill 
from Norwegian council politicians towards the Sami people, but the reactions could show 
that they were in conflict with public opinion. None of this can be concluded with certainty. 
   However, increased power to the Sami parliament could mean that local politicians could 
lose some power. One could speculate on a future scenario in which the Sami parliament get 
the power to decide, (along with Norwegian authorities), important questions related to the 
Sami language that also have significant connotations for the Non-Sami. This would lead to 
consultations, and when the above mentioned politicians take such decisions against the will 
of public, it will very likely increase polarization, when the (in an election) exclusively Sami 
institution, could have great influence on the issue. It is difficult to speculate upon the 
expected development here. Few would deem that the Sami parliament themselves could for 
example, decide about the status of the Sami language in a northern Norway municipality 
without the consent of the council there: nor that such decisions could be taken, with 
consequences at the national level. However, every prediction, from both sides, is as yet too 
speculative. I do foresee the possibility that the Sami parliament be given the power to take 
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important decisions on language issues effecting influence on Non-Sami people. Bearing in 
mind the examples with the signs above, even if such an influence were to be minor or 
symbolic, it should still be regarded as sufficient to cause dividing. One can then expect the 
additional Sami electoral channel, ( or institution), to annoy or provoke people. 
 
 
4. HOW TO FIX THE DOUBLE VOTE PROBLEM? 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
After a rational disposition, this chapter of analysis will be relatively short compared to the 
first one. After this introduction I will be devoting time to discuss the consultation process 
between the Sami parliament and other actors. It will be important for the cooperation to see 
how it functions. The role of the media is the next to be examined, due to the importance that 
those actors have creating the impression people are getting regarding conflicts and politics in 
general. These two perspectives should be seen as pragmatic solutions to the double vote 
problem. I will therefore go on to address the problem in principle, asking the question: does a 
full-scale solution exist? Finally, comparisons will be made to models from other places I 
have looked at. I„ve selected the Scottish West-Lothian Question, and the Sami parliaments in 
Sweden and Finland. 
   With this second chapter of analysis, my purpose is to look at solutions to the problems that 
the double Sami votes cause. The main problem is the legitimization of the Sami voter‟s 
additional electoral channel, which is represented by the Sami parliament, where they alone 
can vote. The problem was described theoretically, but also illustrated with concrete examples 
of issues. A red thread throughout this dissertation has been a prediction of increased power to 
the Sami parliament. The reason being, that I think, few would deny the possibility of this 
coming to pass. The prediction is then very important for the whole analysis; as was shown 
earlier, the Sami parliament seems to have the support of a large majority in the public 
opinion (NSD 2004). Yet, by analyzing several forms of increased power the institution may 
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gain in the future, this support can be jeopardized, locally and/or regionally, maybe even 
nationally. 
   The research question of this thesis includes a question of what could be done with the 
(potentially) negative effects of the double votes. This is the basis for this chapter. It may be 
said that it is impossible to give rights to a minority without generating some situations where 
the majority has to give up various degrees of power. Remember, Lijphart (1995: 283-86) 
proposed seven arguments in favor of minority self-determination. Minority 
overrepresentation was seen as the only drawback, but the guaranteed minority representation, 
autonomy and perhaps veto are more important by far. In other words, perhaps the problems 
facing the majority, in the case double votes, isn‟t worthy of special attention? I think it is: the 
majority should also experience living in a democracy which is legitimate from their point of 
view. A powerful Sami parliament, in which the majority can‟t vote, could be said to be 
positive discrimination and alienation, and they need feel no real sympathy for the minority, 
even if it is on historical grounds. 
   Among the solutions that could be considered, are also those of principal. If one argues that 
the Sami parliament should be abolished, the problems that the dissertation seeks to describe 
would be solved immediately; although the problems with the lack of an institutionalized 
minority voice, which the institution was designed to solve, would remain. However, as 
addressed, I regard abolition as unrealistic, even in the event that the one major party 
supporting such a move was to come into power. A development in which the transference of 
power over to the Sami parliament was being stalled was also studied, and found to be a 
feasible scenario. However, in this chapter, the continued existence of the Sami parliament, 
also with increased power, will mainly be accepted. Instead, an analysis of the institutions‟ 
relation to the larger Norwegian society as one of cooperation should be realistic. How do the 
Sami Parliament communicate with other actors, what problems are the talks faced with, and 
what could be done? Could the Norwegian Sami context learn something from other “double 
vote contexts” like that in Scotland, or the Sami parliaments in Sweden and Finland? 
4.2 THE CONSULTATION PROCESSES 
As mentioned several times, the Sami parliament of today has mainly consultative power. I 
also wrote at length about the possibility of increased power in the future, and forms of veto 
power. Although such power could be regarded as realistic, it would still be rational to believe 
that consultation be given a key role, also in the future. This is because both parties (the Sami 
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people and the larger Norwegian society) should be expected to have an interest in making 
political processes as harmonious as possible. Why should they not see the Sami parliament as 
a cooperating institution, despite it being established as an agent for the Sami affairs? Even if 
it gets a power of veto, the Sami parliament would be expected to have negotiation processes 
with other political and/or societal institutions; and to use the veto right only if the 
negotiations were unsuccessful. 
   In this matter, it is important to realize that consultation processes between the Sami 
parliament and other actors have indeed been around for a long while. One such process was 
addressed in the first analysis chapter, in relation to work on laws that would regulate 
minerals in areas that where traditionally Sami. The consultation between the Sami Parliament 
and the Ministry of Trade and Industry was heavily criticized by the former part. The 
consultation procedure used in this case was established after the passing of the Finnmark Act 
(Semb 2009: 169). However, the procedure, and the law proposal itself was seen as so 
problematic from the Sami point of view that they launched a complaint about it to the ILO. 
What impression is created from such a development? Cases like this probably have various 
aspects, but the main concern should be with the unsatisfactory consultations. If consultations 
are to be regarded as helpful and meaningful, both parts should achieve satisfaction and 
agreement. If meaningful consultations creating cooperation between the political institution 
of the Sami people and other actors appear, then the double vote right of the Sami should be 
seen as less problematic. It will however be impossible to eliminate in principle, or at least, as 
long as a minority-representation model with an especially dedicated assembly are selected.   
   Can helpful information be found in the consultation procedures that exist today? As stated, 
procedures were established after the passing of the Finmark Act. These were called 
“procedures for consultations between state authorities and the Sami parliament”. In the 
introduction, the following statement was made: 
“As an indigenous people, the Sami have the right to be consulted in matters that may affect 
them directly. In order to ensure that work on matters that may directly affect the Sami is 
carried out in a satisfactory manner, the Government and the Sami Parliament agree that 
consultations between State authorities and the Sami Parliament shall be conducted in 
accordance to the annexed procedural guidelines.” (Ministry of labour online) 
   Of course such statements can often differ somewhat from the reality. There could also be a 
wide gap between politicians and bureaucrats at the top level and the negotiators at grass 
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roots. However, the statement implies that the parts should be committed to the rules. The 
judicial dimension of this won‟t be addressed, but although this can‟t be seen as law, it should 
be expected that the parts are following their instructions. The purpose of the procedures, say 
little about the obligations, with the exception of the rules for the international obligations 
towards the Sami having a practical approach (Ministry of labour online). However what is of 
interest here is the point about a partnership perspective between State Authorities and the 
Sami Parliament, when consideration is given to administrative or legislative measures that 
may directly affect the interests of the Sami. I believe this is the kind of plan which could be 
of importance towards a goal of minimizing potential division over disagreements. 
   The proceedings also include areas which may be consulted on. All material and immaterial 
forms of Sami culture could be included, but named examples were: music, theatre, literature, 
art, media, language, religion, cultural heritage, immaterial property rights and traditional 
knowledge, place names, health and social welfare, day care facilities for children, education, 
research, land ownership rights and rights to use lands, matters concerning land 
administration and competing land utilization, business development, reindeer husbandry, 
fisheries, agriculture, mineral exploration and extraction activities, wind power, hydroelectric 
power, sustainable development, preservation of cultural heritage, biodiversity and nature 
conservation (Ministry of Labour online).  
   The majority of these examples could perhaps be seen as less controversial areas where a 
partnership development should be easy, whilst others could be more difficult. Interestingly 
enough, areas in which the Sami parliament has no power today, were also mentioned. This 
includes the reindeer husbandry. Could this be because there are actors already now, who 
believe that this area could be under Sami parliament power in the future? 
   Where material basis for the Sami culture is involved, the three northernmost counties of 
Norway, together with some municipalities further south, are within the area where the State 
has to consult the Sami Parliament (Ministry of Labour online). It should be mentioned that 
the future of the counties, at least as political units, remains uncertain. Although this debate 
shall not be looked at in depth, its result may be of some importance. There are those who 
wish to abolish counties in general, keeping only two administrative levels in Norway in the 
future. This could mean that the Sami parliament has to talk to the municipalities involved, 
although that consultation nowadays is with the State. In other words, conflicts between the 
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Sami parliament and other actors could gain a more local perspective, which I believe could 
be dangerous, if we are to avoid division between the minority, and the majority. 
   The “people to people” approach would appear again. Those in the Sami census may vote in 
municipal elections among the Non-Sami, in addition to the electoral channel they have for 
themselves. This development shall be seen as unrelated to the debate about the 
administrative levels in Norway; it could be expected in the future, that the Sami parliament 
will have consultations with the municipalities anyway. However, if consultations are done 
between the municipalities and the Sami parliament regarding controversial and emotional 
issues, in the future, this could be a dangerous development. The two parts would have to 
agree, and the Non-Sami may be aware of the extra vote that their opponents have. Especially 
dangerous here are smaller municipalities. Think about the (earlier addressed) situation in e.g. 
Kåfjord. I think, in such circumstances, where places are often transparent, and the inhabitants 
(which include Non Sami and Sami) often know each other; the split in the local society could 
be more serious.  
In any case the consultations must be expected to arrive at some point. What would the 
problems in general be with consultations? In negotiations there is of course someone who is 
negotiating on behalf of the involved parts. The parts here would be the Sami Parliament and 
some institutions belonging to the larger society, certainly the State, and perhaps regional 
and/or local level. It could be deemed that negotiators, on different levels, are representing the 
voters. Yet one could also agree with an allegation of remoteness between the negotiators, the 
institutions they are representing, and (more importantly for the democracy), the voters. Seen 
from a democratic theory perspective, it has to be stated without doubt, that consultations and 
negotiations are procedures that are elite-based. They also often have a lack of openness and 
are closed to the influence from external actors. They are not an ideal decision-making model 
(Weigård 2009: 49). Unfortunately, there seem to be few solutions to these problems. Despite 
consultations and negotiations being regarded as elite-based by nature; it could perhaps be 
something a democracy has to accept. What‟s important in relation to such processes is that 
they are exercised by professional people. This is probably necessary, in order for 
negotiations to be successful. But, maybe something could be done to lessen the elitist-mark 
on the processes? 
   If the lack of openness is a serious problem, in practice (something I know too little about) 
there could be solutions toward a larger degree of openness. In a democratic theory 
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perspective, few really purport that 100 % openness and flow of information is necessary for 
an idealistic democracy to work. Too much media attention could damage decision-making 
processes. One example, where they are probably aware of this, is the closed committee-
meetings in the Storting. The will to negotiate and compromise could be reduced if journalists 
are able to record everything. Anyway, the consultation procedures between the State 
Authorities and the Sami parliament did mention something about this, and it seems that they 
agreed with my ideas about “rational secrecy to some degree”: 
 “Information exchanged between State authorities and the Sami Parliament in connection 
with consultations may be exempted from public disclosure provided it is authorized by law. 
The principle of expanded public disclosure shall be practiced. The final positions of the 
parties in individual matters shall be made public.” (Ministry of labour online). 
   Most importantly, the final positions taken by the actors are still made public. However, I 
still think that processes should have an underlying principle of being as public as possible. 
This would probably lessen splitting between the minority and the majority in a potential 
future in which the Sami Parliament has significant power; also impacting (either directly or 
indirectly) the Non-Sami part of the population. Information flow is important in a 
functioning democracy, the lack of it leaves room for misunderstandings, and could cause 
unnecessary partition. However, free information flow, providing there are no serious reasons 
to the contrary, should be an aim for the Sami parliament on a daily basis: and this should also 
apply to those institutions influenced by their policy. It should also be a goal to make all 
information bilingual, at least for the Sami Parliament, since their voters usually master 
Norwegian, while Non-Sami very rarely understand the Sami language. 
4.3 THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA 
Since media are often said to be the “fourth power of State” the role of this societal sector has 
to be addressed. I have written at length about the possible role of the public opinion, and 
reactions to decisions taken by a Sami Parliament (which they are unable to vote for), and 
which could potentially be more powerful in the future. The media create the agenda, and 
their role in covering conflicts and the presentation of policy, is an important one. However, it 
isn‟t so easy to write about their role directly related to the double vote problem, because this 
problem is of principal character and therefore an issue for democratic theory. The press 
would probably report the point about the Sami voters place on both sides of a negotiation 
table and the public opinion would pick up on this. However, I‟m not so sure the Sami 
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Parliament authority, politics and agenda would receive much attention in the Norwegian 
(Non – Sami) press. A great deal ( if not the most) of what goes on in the Sami Parliament in 
the future, will receive very little coverage in the Norwegian Press, on a local, regional or 
National level, unless it happens to be of a controversial nature. 
   The role that the media plays in controversial issues between Sami and Non-Sami, and in 
which Sami Parliament has influence, is therefore of relevant interest. We could start by 
remembering the Finnmark Act. Although I don‟t have analyses, I believe that this Act was 
widely covered by the press, and that they communicated that this act had widespread future 
consequences. Next, we can look at the role of the media when the Sami rights are debated in 
general. As stated in the first introduction chapter, letters to the editor in Northern Norway 
newspapers often seem to be unfair in this matter (Berg 2001). This could create a dilemma 
for the newspapers; the freedom of speech should ensure that unfair letters from angry readers 
get published. But then the papers themselves, should at least take responsibility when politics 
which involve the Sami Parliament are on the agenda. Firstly, they need visit the institution 
regularly and show interest. 
   In the event of the Sami parliament getting most or all control, of the reindeer industry, then 
the press has a job to do. The negotiations between the Sami parliament and other actors (at 
various levels) would create a situation where the Sami part is sitting on both sides of the 
table. Agreements of some nature would then be necessary. Although very different results 
could result from such negotiations, one might expect some antagonism from one or both 
parts, but particularly from the Norwegian one. As division is believed to arrive from such 
misunderstandings, the role of the press becomes more interesting. As mentioned in the first 
introduction chapter, the coverage in the newspapers about the reindeer husbandry focuses 
largely on the problems in the enterprise (Berg 2001:195-226). This shouldn‟t necessarily be 
negative, what if the enterprise itself focuses on the problems because, there are, (from an 
objective point of view), many problems there? This could be the case, but it is too difficult, 
and unnecessary to speculate upon.  
   But there is evidence that the Norwegian media is lacking in insight into the reindeer 
enterprise. For example, Aftenposten, a major national newspaper, clearly seems to be 
without sufficient knowledge about it (Berg 2001: 197). The paper is using persons of 
authority to get information, like the Sami parliament, but their viewpoints don‟t necessarily 
correspond to that of the enterprise. This is of notable interest, when writing about a potential 
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split between the Sami and the larger Norwegian society. Due to the double voting rights, it 
was almost taken for granted that the Sami parliament did represent the interest of the Sami 
voters. When taking into account the threat of a division, it isn‟t always as straightforward. 
However, the result could be that both groups feel alienation in relationship to the Sami 
parliament. This is only speculation, but tendencies do have to be noted in order to predict the 
future; as of today, the Sami parliament doesn‟t even have control over the reindeer industry. 
   However, I still want to focus on the point that the media should strive to cause as little 
misunderstanding as possible. In regards to the reindeer husbandry there seem to be some 
errors which the Norwegian press make repeatedly. There seems to exist a classical variant of 
reindeer reportages. These reports involve people (not usually Sami) who are being sent off 
the land by Reindeer herders (owners). However, the journalists rarely interview the Sami 
Reindeer herder in question (Berg 2001: 111). The press should seek to avoid situations like 
this. If dividing occurs as a result of these misunderstandings, it‟s vital to put a stop to them. 
In addition, any issues considered to be complicated, should be explained in the media. In 
light of the “Aftenposten example” above, it‟s reasonable to believe that many Non-Sami 
(alongside those outside the reindeer enterprise) and probably many journalists have limited 
knowledge of this industry. The solutions are simple, the journalists have to do more research 
and present the facts to the public in a justifiable way. Correct information is of significant 
importance to presenting fair coverage in general. 
   However, the media could make an effort towards clarification related to Sami rights and 
industries, and also in relation to the political debates regarding Sami rights in general. As 
stated before, language barriers could still be an obstacle to providing adequate information 
and debates about Sami issues. The Sami parliament should make an effort to be as bilingual 
as possible. However, it‟s worth taking a look at the press. The Norwegian language in the 
Non-Sami Norwegian press doesn‟t usually present problems for Sami speaking people, yet 
Non Sami Norwegians will probably not be able to read Sami language news and articles. 
How does the Sami press meet these problems? In the “Sami press”, the Sagat paper does 
indeed use Norwegian as their written language. This fact is of great importance, as those 
wishing to gain insight into the Sami public life might otherwise expect language barriers to 
prevent them from doing so. The Sami press is larger than this newspaper, but Sagat should 
still be regarded as the most important. Sami media choosing to publish exclusively in the 
Sami language would face a dilemma; and may then have to accept that the Non-Sami 
population has limited access and understanding of their stories and issues. 
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4.4 DO REAL SOLUTIONS EXIST? 
After recommending the best possible consultation procedures between the Sami parliament 
and other actors, and giving the media a sense of their responsibility; it‟s now time to see if 
more complete solutions exist to the problems with the double votes. An easy one does exist, 
and it will eliminate the problem completely. This solution is simply the abolishment of the 
Sami parliament. As stated several times, it‟s not very feasible to believe that will happen, but 
it‟s still possible. An abolishment would reactivate the problem of a lack of minority 
representation, but that isn‟t something this thesis is concerned with. One solution may be that 
the Sami Parliament becomes a purely consultative organ, much like today‟s situation, but it 
neglects the likely scenario of the institution gaining significantly more power in the future. 
The double vote problem would continue to exist in such a solution, but the Parliament would 
be viewed as completely advisory. This could also be seen as problematic, the double votes 
could still be visible even if the various Non-Sami authorities follow the advice, but the 
problem should at least be minimized. 
   One solution could be to segregate the case-sharing between the Sami Parliament and other 
political elected bodies completely. This would mean that the agenda in the Sami Parliament 
becomes totally segregated from that of the other actors. It would then mean that issues 
handled by the Sami Parliament would be related only to the Sami people, (or those registered 
in the Sami census), and would no longer affect the Non-Sami. This idea should be considered 
purely in principal. Would the double votes actually still exist if such a division of the policy 
making came to pass? This isn‟t an easy question; the Sami voters would still have an extra 
electoral channel, whether or not this assembly (in this particular situation) worked alongside, 
or towards, the other elected political levels. How could this be possible? I have previously 
shown how the Sami Parliament could be expected to consulate and negotiate with other 
political actors, and how that could make the Sami double votes more visible. However, is it 
possible for the Sami Parliament to exist without cooperation and talks with the other actors? 
The term “talking” could easily be related to consultations/negotiations, but the institution 
could, on different questions, simply clarify their views. The role of a pure advisory organ 
would mean even less power than the institution has today. Other ways of separating the Sami 
Parliament from the other political environments in Norway could be to give it powers in 
areas that are not considered to have any impact on those outside the Sami public sphere. 
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   There exist two Sami high schools in Finmark (Karasjok and Kautokeino). In 2002, a 
committee proposed that those schools should be administrated by the Sami Parliament 
(Ministry of Education and Research online). The committee found it reasonable to give the 
assembly the power to administrate and develop these schools. The Sami Parliament 
suggested that they should be able to decide on the content of pupil‟s curriculum. This kind of 
jurisdiction could be interesting if we want to create a Sami parliament which doesn‟t have a 
practical overlap with other political actors in their areas of work. Some other problems could 
still be addressed here. For example, how if some Non-Sami pupils use the same school and 
experience a lack of serious influence on the school regulations? Again, such a situation 
should only be considered in principal, if such pupils wished to study at these schools, they 
would almost certainly accept, that the school has a primary Sami facilitation. 
   Another example could be in cases when the Sami parliament is give grants for enterprise 
development from its Sami development fund. They have the power to allocate such grants in 
areas regarded as Sami language areas, related to Sami enterprise developments. This should 
also be seen as a way of making an (almost) complete separation of power between the Sami 
parliament and other political actors. A less controversial step could be if the same principle 
was applied to cultural development. A similar problem of principal exists here; the grants are 
given in geographical areas, unrelated to the ethnic status of the receivers (Weigård 2009: 40). 
A Non-Sami applicant could probably accept that he receives advantages that are mainly 
established for the Sami people. He would be unlikely to criticize the organ that gives him the 
grants, even if he himself was lacking influence. In the examples with the schools and the 
grants, the double vote problem isn‟t completely eliminated, but at least minimized. However, 
since the Sami Parliament can be expected to get power far beyond these examples, the 
solution with segregated case-sharing between the Sami parliament and other actors, should 
be seen as mostly a theoretical option. As I addressed, various issues, like the reindeer 
husbandry, language power and other areas would probably interact too much with the larger 
Norwegian society. 
   Some solutions exist in principal, but they are unrealistic. Those who are now registered in 
the Sami census could simply lose their votes in the future to one or more of the elections in 
the larger Norwegian society, namely the municipal, county and Storting elections); it‟s still 
possible to discuss such a scenario in theory. The significant democratic problem then caused 
would be that the Sami voters lose influence over those decisions that affect them directly. (It 
could perhaps be argued that they deserve it because the Non-Sami Norwegians have no 
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influence on the politics within the Sami Parliament). In such a situation the most important 
factor would be whether or not the decision capability of the Sami parliament is overlapping 
with one, or more, of the other related political organs. Since its decision competence doesn‟t 
match that of the other organs, the solution to abolish and redirect Sami voting rights to one or 
more organs outside the Sami parliament is too complex (Weigård 2009: 48). Those who 
eventually argue that the Sami voters deserve to lose their voting right to one or more other 
organs, have to take into account the fact that the Sami Parliament are much less powerful 
than for example the National Assembly or Storting. If the Sami voters should lose their 
voting right to the National Assembly of Norway, (thereby gaining a mighty Sami Parliament 
in return), the process of establishing a Sami State may well be underway. This is of course 
highly meditative. A solution that would give the Sami Parliament power equal to for 
instance, a county could also imply that everyone living within specific border-defined area 
(like Northern Norway, Finnmark) would be able to vote. In other words, this would become 
a territorial based assembly. Weigård (2009: 41) believed that this would entail the institution 
being transformed into a new (excess) administrative level; whereby the Sami objective 
would be diluted after some time. It‟s rational to agree with that, but the role of the Sami 
people and Sami politics in a future Northern Norway regionalization context (maybe also 
involving areas of neighboring countries) could be an interesting conjecture. 
 
4.5 LEARNING FROM OTHER PLACES? 
As addressed before, the problems with double votes are not unique for the context of this 
dissertation. Despite believing that every situation should be considered to be unique, it‟s still 
rational to believe that some lessons could be learned from other situations, because the 
double vote problem is one of principal. I have now shown that (an unlikely) abolishment of 
the actual institution seems to be the only way to solve the problem completely, although I did 
present various ways to compensate or minimize the problem. What then could be learned 
from other contexts where a voter group has an additional electoral channel for themselves? 
One model exists which could be addressed; however, I still have doubts about its relevance. 
The so called Renner/Bauer model was a proposed model to regulate the relationship between 
different national groups in the Habsburg monarchy (Austria-Hungary) prior to the First 
World War (Semb 2005: 543). Using such tools designed for a multicultural empire which 
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was dissolved nearly a century ago would have little relevance. However, the principles are 
worth looking at. The core in this model was a “personality principle”; the individuals had 
two votes, and two types of jurisdiction existed; one territorial, and one cultural. One way to 
do this in Norway could be as follows: the National Assembly of Norway, at this time, could 
be transformed into a “territorial parliament” and designated fundamental tasks such as 
foreign policy, defense, and basic economic policy. In addition, the Sami Parliament would 
then coexist with a Norwegian Parliament (or Norske-tinget). They could then have cultural 
jurisdiction over both Sami and Norwegians respectively, but independent of where in 
Norway they are living (Semb 2005: 544). All voters would then have the right to vote for the 
Territorial Parliament, but they would have to choose whether they vote for the Sami or 
Norwegian Parliament. With this model there is indeed a theoretical solution to the double 
vote problem. But is it worth putting into practice? Not necessarily. If the climate between the 
Sami and the rest of the Norwegian society had been showing greater signs of polarization, 
this model could possibly function; and in fact, no eventualities can be ruled out in the future. 
An extremely complex pattern of decision-making could create (serious) new problems. One 
example is how culture should be defined (Semb 2005: 545). 
   Scotland now has its own parliament. A “devolution” process was carried out in the United 
Kingdom before the millennium. Scotland and Wales got their own parliaments, in addition to 
the Westminster Parliament in London. The Sami people are an indigenous people, while 
Scotland and Wales, once upon a time, were independent kingdoms. This would be a main 
context problem. The Scottish solution (a more rational case choice to study than the weaker 
Wales Assembly) does however imply double votes. The West Lothian question could be 
defined as: 
 The question of the role at Westminster of members representing constituencies in parts of 
the United kingdom to which a measure of self-government in domestic affairs has been 
granted. Another is the role of such MPs (And those representing English constituencies) in 
the consideration of matters now devolved to bodies elsewhere in the UK (Gay (edit) 2011: 1) 
   We could refer to this as “the English question”: how England should be governed after the 
devolution process in the UK. The question is about a constitutional anomaly; MPs in the 
Westminster Parliament from Scottish constituencies (indeed also those from Wales and 
Northern Ireland can vote in London on legislation that affects England, but English MPs 
can‟t vote on issues that are now devolved to the Scottish Parliament. The question addresses 
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double votes and is analogous to our situation. While voters in England have no electoral 
influence on the work in the Scottish Parliament, Non-Sami Norwegian citizens are without 
the democratic influence on the policies formed in the Sami Parliament. 
   What solutions could be made to fix this problem in Britain? The establishment of 
parliaments for the nations of the United Kingdom (although territorially-based) could 
rationally lead to the establishment of a parliament for England too. Or, in other words, the 
United Kingdom could become a federal state. In the manifesto of the Conservative Party 
prior to the 2010 parliament election, they did propose new rules that would make it necessary 
to have the consent of the English (or the English and Welsh) MPs to pass legislation that 
refers to their area (Gay (edit) 2011: 27). This would probably mean that the Scottish MPs 
lose their votes when issues which are devolved to Scotland are on the agenda in 
Westminster, and thereby only apply to England. The problem for comparability is that the 
Sami Parliament has devolved power, but the Sami census voters aren‟t represented as a 
group in the national assembly in addition, as Scotland is. 
   A solution with Sami representative members of the storting could have created a somewhat 
comparable situation. This idea isn‟t new, and various solutions could be designed, such as 
Sami voters voting for Sami members, in addition to the ordinary seats in the storting. This 
would in fact give them “triple votes”. However, it‟s most likely that they would have their 
own members of the storting, but without the right to vote on ordinary candidates in addition. 
In such a situation, the Sami members could be unable to vote in matters relating only to the 
larger Norwegian society, because power in this field would be devolved to the Sami 
Parliament. A significant problem here would be the “people to people” approach, (that the 
Sami voter is also a Norwegian voter at the same time). The solution could work theoretically, 
but would most likely be easier to implement if the Sami Parliament was territorially-based. 
   What we can learn from the West Lothian question however, is that the double vote problem 
is probably more of a principal than a practical character. The problem has lead to a 
perceptible debate, but it isn‟t deemed to be a dangerous threat to democracy, and therefore 
little has been done to resolve it. In addition, there are a larger percentage of Scotts compared 
to Englishmen in the United Kingdom than there are Sami compared to Non-Sami in Norway 
(Weigård 2009: 49). In addition, the Scottish Parliament is far more powerful than the 
Norwegian Sami Parliament. Bearing in mind that the problem isn‟t regarded as significant in 
the United Kingdom, it could be viewed as negligible in Norway, and of a purely principal art. 
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However, the problem could receive more attention at the regional or local, than the national 
level. Especially if the power of the Sami Parliament was seen to clearly overlap that of 
Finnmark County; many of the voters to the county assembly are also members of the Sami 
census (Weigård 2009: 49). 
   Lessons from the situation with Sami Parliaments in Sweden and Finland seem to be 
difficult to grasp. The double vote problem in general may be even more negligible in Sweden 
and Finland, because those parliaments are not regarded as very powerful. The Sami 
Parliament in Sweden wasn‟t established for its own sake, but in order to give the Sami 
people some real authority in relation to the state (Solbakk 2004: 191). The main tasks seem 
to be related to culture, but other issues, such as reindeer enterprise are addressed by the 
assembly. The problem with dividing could also arise here, although it is impossible to 
speculate further. An interesting difference to the Norwegian situation is that the Swedish 
Sami Parliament are partly elected, and partly governed by the State. The institutions speaker 
is elected by the Swedish government (Solbakk 2004: 195). This is somewhat interesting; 
maybe the Norwegian government should get some control over the daily life in the Sami 
parliament to avoid its potential power increase in the future?  
   There doesn‟t seems to be much help available from the Finnish Sami Parliament in this 
matter. Interestingly enough, Finland gave its Sami inhabitants a parliament that is partly 
territorial, and partly ethnicity-based. However, with a budget consisting of a few million 
Finnish mark in 2001 (Solbakk 2004: 214-15) it seems unlikely that the institution can 
become powerful enough to cause problems in relation to the Non-Sami. Both the Swedish 
and the Finnish Sami Parliaments seem to exhibit the principles of double voting, but they are 
probably too negligible to give solutions towards dealing with the double vote problems. The 
Swedish situation with some level of government interference could be of some interest, but it 









The research question was as follow: “Which democratic-theoretical problems could double 
Sami votes create? If it creates unjustifiable outcomes, what can then be done to make up for 
the negative effects?” 
 After researching this problem, I would still say that complete answers aren‟t easy to give, 
and indeed that they shouldn‟t always be necessary when working with social sciences, of 
which political science is a part. Reflections may be a better way of answering such questions 
than “hard facts”.  
   The problems with “double Sami votes” in democracy theory can be analyzed from both a 
theoretical and a practical perspective. The theoretical perspective could be explained in the 
simple way that the Sami people, represented by those registered in the Sami census, have an 
electoral channel, in the Sami parliament, (which only they alone have access to), in addition 
to the other electoral channels in Norway. The problems which arise from this, on the one 
hand, are that such a double voting right are threatens one of the main principles of justice, 
namely the equality of citizens. A principle with “one man, one vote” would make the 
practice with double votes a serious, and fundamental, threat to democracy. It‟s impossible to 
accept from such a point of view. However, those who are arguing in such terms have to 
reflect on the meaning of “democracy”. The term is indeed a complex one. A well-functioning 
“rule by the people” can‟t necessarily involve the principle of equal votes. The reason should 
be well-known, the protection of minority rights is vital for a democracy to work well. 
Essentially, the context with Norway‟s indigenous people, the Sami people, is a minority 
context. 
   In the theory chapter, it was seen to be quite easy to find arguments in favor of a minority‟s 
right to self-determination. In fact, the minority overrepresentation could be seen as the only 
drawback, while the arguments in favor should be regarded as much more important than this 
(Lijphart 1995: 283-86). I myself would also say that the rights of the Sami people, and 
especially their right to have their own Assembly, should be regarded as well justified. Since 
the arguments in favor of minority political rights are as strong as they are, some could 
question whether the right to a double vote really is a problem for democratic theory at all. In 
fact, the lack of such rights could be a larger threat to a well working democracy, in contexts 
where minorities exists. Therefore, an important task is to assess how large the problems with 
double votes for a minority, our Sami minority, really are. The only real drawback should be 
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tested. Could it really be significant, or is it actually a drawback that only creates a problem in 
principal? This state of wondering, lead me to study the relationship between the Sami 
minority and the larger Norwegian society. Such a theme is perhaps much larger an issue than 
this thesis can address. The historical circumstances, with the “Norwegification” 
(fornorskningspolitikk) were addressed. Further, as stated repeatedly, few would regard the 
relationship between the Sami people and the larger Norwegian society as visibly 
problematic. 
   Regarding the Sami parliament, the institution seems to have the support of an 
overwhelmingly large part of the population in Norway (NSD 2004). In other words, the 
minority overrepresentation, the only drawback with minority self-determination rights, 
doesn‟t seem to be a cause for concern to most people in Norway. However, this was viewed 
in relationship to today‟s situation. The thesis was intended to have a futuristic approach. The 
“red thread” was an assumption that the Sami parliament could be expected to get increased 
power in the not too distant future. Few would deny this possibility, but it can‟t be taken for 
granted. But it should be seen as a far more realistic scenario than that of a reversal of power 
for the Sami institution, or indeed an abolishment altogether. 
   Assumptions about a significant different role for the Sami Parliament in the future, (namely 
one with much more power) would make a great difference. This was in fact, the reason for 
writing the master‟s thesis in a somewhat futuristic perspective. Despite the undisputed fact 
that the Assembly has support of the public opinion, its power is, largely consultative at this 
time. A red thread during the thesis was warnings about potential dividing/polarization, 
between the Sami people and the larger Norwegian society in the event of the institution 
gaining a significant increase in power. I stated that this could be expected in the future, and 
the Non-Sami populations‟ attention could be alerted to the double voting rights which 
Norway‟s minority has. Some specific issues were addressed, (these were issues which should 
be regarded as policy areas) which often show conflicts between Non-Sami and Sami. One 
example is the reindeer industry, which often seems to get the Medias attention regarding its 
problems. An important point to note, this industry isn‟t controlled by the Sami Parliament at 
all, as of today. However, this was still viewed as a possible scenario. Another scenario which 
was considered possible of causing notable division was that of cases regarding the Sami 
language (in situations that involve many Non-Sami), as was the case with the road signs. 
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   What does such speculation have to do with the Sami people‟s right to vote double? In fact 
it doesn‟t need to have connection with the double vote problem at all. However, I did regard 
the relationship between the Sami Parliament and “the outside world” as being important. In 
fact, the policy agenda of that institution doesn‟t need to have notable interaction with those 
outside its voter census. Yet I did show that such a development is too difficult to envisage. 
Only if the institution has limited power over some issues, like culture, could it be regarded as 
having an agenda separated from the other political organs, and societal actors, in Norway. A 
completely separated agenda should however be regarded as impossible in practice. 
   The reason being that the issues that the Sami Parliament could be expected to work with 
should be regarded as interacting too much with other parts of the larger society. I took a look 
at the reindeer industry, an enterprise which the Sami Parliament could perhaps gain control 
over in the future (those involved at present don‟t seem to want that yet). The interaction 
between that enterprise and for example, the agriculture could often lead to conflicts, and this 
gave us a practical approach to the double vote problem. Those unable to vote for the Sami 
Parliament could still be affected by its decisions. Without the possibility to affect decisions 
that have clear impact on them, I suggested, several times, that splitting could arise between 
the Sami people and the larger Norwegian society. In conclusion I would say that the 
probability of increased polarization, if and when the Sami parliament gets significantly 
increased power, is the closest to a theory that I could present. How great a challenge could 
this be for the Norwegian democracy? 
 
5.2 A PRIMARILY PRINCIPAL PROBLEM 
With several arguments in favor of minority self-determination and minority 
overrepresentation as the only drawback (Lijphart 1995: 283-86) it is essentially to say some 
final words about how great the problem really is, (and more importantly), could be expected 
to become in the future. Since it‟s impossible to foresee future development, we have to use 
today‟s situation as a guide. We get an idea of differences emerging between the national, and 
the regional/local level. In general, most would agree to an assessment of the relationship 
between the Sami people and the Non-Sami Norwegians being without significant 
confrontation. The public opinion did also clearly support the minority‟s right to its own 
parliament (NSD 2004), which is a basis for the double vote principle. Other comparable 
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contexts seemed difficult to find. The West-Lothian Question in Scotland, however, could 
throw some interesting light on the matter. The aspect of double Scottish votes was heavily 
debated, but wasn‟t seen to be a major problem there (Weigård 2009: 48-9), and this was a 
situation with a much larger minority, and a far more powerful parliament. 
   The regional, or local levels, should therefore be of more interest, in anticipation of a future 
threat of polarization due to the Sami people‟s right to a double vote. Firstly, the situation in 
Finnmark could well become more important, because of the large percentage of Sami voters 
in relation to the overall county voters (Weigård 2009: 49). Secondly comes the fact that the 
relationship between Sami and Non-Sami at a local level would be more significant; due to 
the transparency often revealed at this level. Some political issues like those regarding the use 
of Sami language in places which aren‟t regarded as distinctly Sami, could escalate, becoming 
more explosive in the future. This indicates that power to the Sami Parliament on such issues 
could create more problems than it solves if a well-working democracy is to be the goal. 
Another example illustrating a greater chance of polarization at the regional/local level are the 
unfair manners in which the Non-Sami press present stories concerning Sami issues (Berg 
2001). I believe such tendencies in the grassroots can be a source for increased splitting at 
these lower levels in the context of a future Sami parliament with a much more power, and 
where only the Sami may vote. 
5.3 THE SOLUTION - CONSOCIATION AND COOPERATION 
As was shown, the problems related to the double vote right of the Sami people, namely a 
possible future polarization, probably exist primarily as a principal problem. The feared 
dividing should be considered to cause most concern at the regional and local level. It could 
be asked whether or not the double vote problem, really are a problem for the democracy to 
deal with at all. My answer is that it is, and it should be dealt with. Idealistically, all efforts 
should be made to ensure the democracy of a country function as well as possible. It doesn‟t 
need to cost too much either, but if the double vote could be given both a principal and a 
practical study, the same would be rational for suggested solutions. 
   A solution to this problem doesn‟t really exist, with two exceptions. The first one is the 
abolishment of the Sami parliament. It‟s unlikely to happen, but still idealistically possible, 
and it would have solved the problems with double votes, but the problems caused by a lack 
of minority representation, and which existed prior to the establishment of the institution, 
would then return. But those problems wouldn‟t be considered relevant to this thesis. In 
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today‟s situation, when the double vote isn‟t regarded to be major problem, it can‟t be said to 
justify the abolishment of the Sami Parliament. The other solution to the problems was of a 
theoretical nature, namely “a shared procedure” between the Sami Parliament and other 
institutions. Although it could very well work on some issues, I still believe that the policy 
agenda of the assembly interact too much with the larger society to make it feasible. 
   The practical solution approach looked at ways of minimizing the potential conflicts 
between the Sami Parliament and other societal actors and institutions. This is probably the 
path to take. The Sami Parliament as an institution should be seen as an organ to cooperate 
with, rather than confront. It should be engaged in talks to find the best possible solutions for 
all parts involved. The consultations would be important. In these processes, the double vote 
problem is of somewhat more practical nature, since the voters to the Sami Parliament are 
sitting on both sides of the table, when the Sami parliament are negotiating with another 
democratically elected actor,( like the municipality, the county, or the State). This is however 
still a principal situation, the negotiators could still be regarded as having a significant 
distance to the voters. In an attempt to solve the problematic scenario where one part sits on 
both sides of a negotiating table, it would be imperative to make the negotiations as successful 
as possible. All agreements should strive to satisfy both parts equally. One might say that this 
is a fundamental requirement of all negotiations anyway. However, one case at least failed to 
meet such standards, and they were criticized by the minority, represented by the Sami 
Parliament (Semb 2009: 169). If well-working negotiations were to be established, the goal to 
form a cooperative relationship with the Sami Parliament would be achieved. 
   The role the media play is another important aspect which I believe should be used to 
minimize the danger of double vote problem sowing the seeds of increased polarization. This 
is simply because of the power that the media has in swaying public political opinions. 
Reliable information is essential to stop misunderstandings, also in the consultation processes, 
(although some secrecy could be justified there). Bilingual coverage in the media, at least in 
the Sami Press, should be an aim, and the Sami Parliament should strive to be as bilingual as 
possible. The presentation of political news by Non-Sami media is also important: the 
journalists have to be knowledgeable in the relevant issues, and most importantly, present it in 





A main challenge when writing this dissertation was the lack of former research on the precise 
problems that were addressed. I had to stake out my own path to some degree. I had no 
guidelines for literature, but I consider the chosen sources to be the best available to me. 
However, tips could be given about future research on the topic, and issues around it. Firstly, 
more precise information about the attitudes and Norwegian public opinion towards the Sami 
minority would be of interest. Other research issues should be related to how the Sami 
Parliament interacts with its environment and how it talks with other actors, in the present 
day, and in the future. With sufficient materials on these topics, it would be easier to evaluate 
the double vote problem and to estimate how large it could become. 
   I consider the theory of minority rights, to be an excellent approach to analyzing the 
problems of double votes. However, it may be regarded as biased; it was easy to find strong 
arguments in favor of minority overrepresentation, and the drawbacks weren‟t regarded as 
substantial. For those who want to do further research on the issue, it would be interesting to 
speculate about results from other approaches. One approach could have focused on how 
conflicts are created, since a main point has been that the double votes could cause dividing 
between the Sami people and the larger population in Norway. If others were to take such an 
approach on the Norwegian Sami minority context, they could perhaps better predict whether 
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